University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2015

Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced
Legal Norm
Paul MacMahon

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
MacMahon, Paul, "Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal Norm" (2015). Minnesota Law Review. 276.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/276

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an
Underenforced Legal Norm
Paul MacMahon

†

INTRODUCTION
Most contract litigation requires courts to give meaning to
contracts using doctrines of interpretation and implied terms.
The most ambitious of these doctrines is the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. According to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts (Restatement), “[e]very contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
1
performance and its enforcement,” and the duty of good faith
and fair dealing is well established in most American
2
3
jurisdictions. Though few doubt its significance, the duty’s
meaning is notoriously unclear. Good faith is “an intangible
4
and abstract quality with no technical meaning”; its fellow
† Assistant Professor of Law, London School of Economics and Political
Science. Thanks to Charles Fried, Hugh Collins, John Goldberg, Henry Smith,
Michael Klarman, Richard Fallon, Todd Rakoff, Josh Chafetz, Joseph Singer,
Ray Madoff, Deirdre Mask, Seth Davis, and Michael Morley for comments on
earlier versions. I also benefited from workshops at Harvard Law School, the
London School of Economics, the University of Arkansas, the University of
Baltimore, the University of San Diego, and the University of Pennsylvania.
Copyright © 2015 by Paul MacMahon.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
2. See Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75
IOWA L. REV. 861, 869 (1990) (noting that the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing is “standard common law doctrine”). Texas is a rare exception to
the general consensus in favor of a general common-law duty of good faith and
fair dealing. There, “the duty of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to protect parties who have a special relationship based on trust or unequal bargaining power.” Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex.
1994); see also Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About Contractual Good Faith
in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1237 (1994) (criticizing the Texas Supreme
Court’s limited application of good faith).
3. Robert S. Summers, Good Faith Revisited, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 723,
726 (2009) (“I believe there is no obligation in all of the U.C.C. and in general
contract law of more overall importance than the general obligation of good
faith.”).
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990).
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traveler, “fair dealing,” is no more precise. Determining the
scope of such “nebulous” standards has caused courts “intracta6
ble difficulty.” Exasperation with the case law on good faith
and fair dealing is commonplace among contracts scholars, who
have confessedly had “very little success in agreeing on stand7
ards that might give a court guidance.”
This Article aims to make sense of good faith and fair dealing by showing that it is an underenforced legal norm. Let me
explain. Much of the difficulty with good faith and fair dealing
involves a mismatch between, on one hand, what legislatures
and judges say and, on the other hand, what judges do. At first
glance, the doctrine seems to demand that parties adhere to
lofty standards of contractual conduct: the Restatement states
that the duty involves “faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
8
party.” The Uniform Commercial Code’s (U.C.C.; the Code)
general definition of good faith encompasses both “honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
9
fair dealing.” The duty, one court recently said, is breached
when a party “exercises discretion authorized in a contract in
10
an unreasonable way.” These ways of expressing the duty
seem to give judges and juries a powerful role in pronouncing
on the appropriateness of the parties’ post-formation conduct,
regardless of whether the contract’s text explicitly forbids the
defendant’s action.
But in the real world of litigation, the application of good
faith and fair dealing has generally fallen short of these demanding ideals. The case law is replete with judges expressing
11
the need for caution, and courts have devised various
restrictive doctrinal tests that make it difficult to establish a
5. The term did not even merit a definition in the sixth edition of
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY.
6. Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981
DUKE L.J. 619, 619–20 (1981).
7. James J. White, Good Faith and the Cooperative Antagonist, 54 SMU
L. REV. 679, 680 (2001).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
9. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2014) (emphasis added). The definition of good
faith under the Code has evolved over the years, as explained in Part I.A. infra.
10. Montanez v. HSBC Mortg. Corp. (USA), 876 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Phila. Plaza-Phase II v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust &
Sav. Ass’n, No. 3745, 2002 WL 1472337, at *6 (Pa. Ct. C.P. June 21, 2001)).
11. See, e.g., Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys.
Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998) (“[I]mplying obligations based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a cautious enterprise.”).
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breach of the duty. When evaluating the defendant’s perfor13
mance, courts sometimes use deferential standards of review,
akin to corporate law’s business judgment rule. In addition,
courts often require plaintiffs to establish a bad motive, trick14
ery, or some other form of particularly egregious conduct by
15
the defendant. Another way that courts make it difficult to invoke the duty is to place challenging evidentiary burdens upon
16
those claiming breaches.
Further, in some contexts,
particularly suits challenging terminations of employment,
many courts effectively refuse to apply the doctrine of good
17
faith and fair dealing. And some judges are hostile to any
doctrine that allows the implication of terms beyond the
18
contract’s express text.
In response to this clear divergence between the rhetoric of
good faith and the reality of judicial enforcement, scholars have
articulated two main ways of closing the gap. Advocates of literalism in the interpretation and construction of contracts contend that courts should “level down” the rhetoric of good faith
19
to match the reality of their enforcement practices. Some go so
far as to say that American courts should abandon their decades-long experiment with the doctrine of good faith perfor12. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith in
Contract Law: Is It Time To Write Its Obituary?, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 10–
12, 21 (2009) (“[M]ost courts balk at giving the obligation real substantive force
and effect.”).
13. E.g., Svela v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 807 F.2d 1494, 1501 (9th Cir.
1987) (refusing to engage in “judicial second-guessing of the economic decisions of franchisors”).
14. E.g., Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.).
15. E.g., Unishippers Global Logistics, LLC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.,
526 F. App’x 899, 910 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding that the freight service company’s conduct in terminating a long-term services agreement “[did] not rise to
the level of action so egregious as to constitute a breach of good faith” under
Utah law).
16. E.g., Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234,
1238–39, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs suing the federal government for breach of the implied covenant must provide clear and convincing
evidence of bad faith).
17. E.g., Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 851 (Kan. 1987) (“[T]he
principle of law stated in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 . . . is overly
broad and should not be applicable to employment-at-will contracts.”).
18. E.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908
F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[P]rinciples of good faith . . .
do not block use of terms that actually appear in the contract.”).
19. E.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (“There is no blanket duty of good faith . . . . Contract law does not require parties to behave altruistically toward each other.”).
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mance. Supporters of a more extensive judicial role take the
opposite approach. In the face of weak enforcement practices,
they contend that courts should “level up” those practices to
21
bring them into line with expansive conceptions of fairness.
Contending that the duty can usefully be understood as an
underenforced legal norm, this Article offers a way to reconcile
rhetoric and judicial enforcement in good faith and fair dealing.
The duty is valid as a legal norm to the fullest extent, requiring
parties to treat each other reasonably when exercising
contractual discretion. But the rules of decision applied by the
courts when adjudicating disputes over good faith and fair
dealing involve only partial enforcement of the norm’s
demands. Judicial decision rules draw their inspiration from
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, but courts, due to their
limited competence, do not attempt to exhaust the duty’s
content. Underenforcement is particularly likely to make sense
where other mechanisms for checking unreasonable contractual
conduct—especially self-help and reputational sanctions—are
available and likely to be effective. Though courts may have
overreacted to the difficulties of adjudicating breaches of good
faith and fair dealing, I contend that some degree of
underenforcement of the norm is sensible.
Contrary to the assumption common to the leveling-up and
22
leveling-down strategies, then, I contend that legal obligation
in the law of contracts can exist in a particular instance even
though the legal system will not attach a sanction to some instances of its breach. To explain how this can be so, I adopt Meir Dan-Cohen’s distinction between conduct rules and decision
23
rules. Like any other legal rule, the law of good faith and fair
dealing can be understood both as a rule of conduct directed at
20. E.g., Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract
Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
559, 562 (2006).
21. See, e.g., Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1029 (2003) (arguing for judicial enforcement of “expansive notions of equality” via the good faith doctrine); Richard E. Speidel,
Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 789, 797 (1993)
(courts should find bad faith where “one party’s conduct deviates from internal
norms generated by the relationship”).
22. For an explicit statement of this generally held assumption, see Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1728, 1780 n.167, 1783 (2008) (assuming, for the sake of
argument, that “a contractual obligation might exist without any sanction attached to breach,” but claiming “that is not the contract law we have”).
23. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 627 (1984).
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the parties (a conduct rule) and as a set of rules directed at
24
courts tasked with enforcing the norm (decision rules).
Though we generally expect conduct rules and decision rules to
align, my suggested way forward allows them to diverge in the
good faith and fair dealing context: the conduct rule extends to
behavior not covered by the decision rules.
25
Though mostly absent from private law scholarship, the
notion of underenforced legal norms is established in other areas of the law. The idea is particularly well known in constitutional law, where scholars have long argued that it is justifiable
for gaps to open up between the meaning of the Constitution
26
and the doctrines the courts devise for its enforcement.
Justiciability doctrines like the political question doctrine provide the most obvious instances of the courts holding their
27
fire. More subtly, the doctrines the courts have devised for adjudicating equal protection cases—particularly the rule of rational basis review that governs ordinary cases—fall short of
28
full enforcement. Courts refrain from full enforcement of constitutional norms because of the special limitations and pitfalls
29
of judicial action. Similar ideas are at work in a recent vein of
corporate law scholarship. In that field, scholars have noted a
disparity between standards of conduct and standards of re30
view in the law of directors’ and officers’ duties. Without making the link with constitutional law, one writer has recently argued that directors’ and officers’ duties are underenforced and
that partial underenforcement is a justifiable response to the
31
institutional limitations of courts and judicial sanctions.
24. Id.
25. One exception is Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To
Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 593, 609–10 (2008) (distinguishing between conduct rules and
decision rules in property law). It seems the closest anyone has come to using
the distinction in the scholarship on good faith and fair dealing is Jane Stapleton’s contention that English courts respond episodically to concerns like good
faith and reasonableness through the use of “incidence rules.” Jane Stapleton,
Good Faith in Private Law, 52 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 28–30 (1999).
26. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1278–79 (2006).
27. See id. at 1280.
28. See infra Part II.A.2 for an examination of this form of
underenforcement.
29. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection,
72 MINN. L. REV. 311, 321–24 (1987).
30. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 438 (1993).
31. Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 550–51 (2012).
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In the same way that a constitutional norm or a rule of
corporate law can be valid and binding on government actors or
corporate office-holders even though the courts will not always
32
award a remedy for its violation, the norm of good faith and
fair dealing binds parties even though they face no risk of legal
33
sanction for certain kinds of breach. The insight that good
faith and fair dealing is an underenforced legal norm provides
both an explanation for the current state of the doctrine and
the beginnings of a suggested way forward. In brief, we should
abandon the search for a single, crisp definition of good faith
and fair dealing that courts can apply in every case. Instead,
we should be moving toward a series of sub-doctrines applicable
to different contexts. Because the relative effectiveness of
courts and non-judicial sanctions varies greatly in different
contexts, we should not be surprised that the courts have been
more receptive to good faith claims in some areas than in oth34
ers. This kind of doctrinal elaboration would not provide a replacement for the norm of good faith and fair dealing, any more
than “tiers of scrutiny” in constitutional law replace the constitutional norm of equal protection. Rather, we should be seeking
a set of judicially manageable standards inspired by the norm
of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain the development of the good faith and fair dealing norm in American
contract law, emphasizing the gap between the rhetoric of good
faith and fair dealing and the reality of judicial practice. In
Part II, I explain the notion of underenforced norms in constitutional law, focusing particularly on the example of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. I also canvass
the literature on the divergence between standards of conduct
and standards of review in corporate law. Armed with insights
from constitutional and corporate law, I return in Part III to
good faith and fair dealing in contracts. The parallels between
these contexts are, I claim, illuminating in several ways. I explore the reasons why courts or legislators would deliberately
choose to announce a broad norm of good faith and fair dealing
while eschewing full judicial enforcement. In Part IV, I examine the normative implications of the insight, making a series
32. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978).
33. See Part III.B infra (describing how the availability of alternative
sanctions makes up for the underenforcement of the norm).
34. Stock contracts and franchise statutes are two examples of areas
where courts accept arguments about good faith to differing degrees. See Part
IV.A. infra.
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of doctrinal proposals.
I. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING: RHETORIC AND
REALITY
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is a tool that helps
35
courts discern the meaning of, or to fill gaps in, contracts that
36
the parties have already concluded. Contracts are notoriously
37
incomplete. Lacking infinite foresight and endless time to
clarify their potential future entitlements and responsibilities,
contracting parties do not provide specifically for every contingency that might arise during the course of performance. By
accident or by design, then, contracts give parties discretion in
the ways that they perform and enforce their mutual
obligations. In turn, this discretion creates a risk that it will be
exercised in a purely self-interested or opportunistic way. But
the courts are not powerless to police exercises of postcontractual discretion. Various interpretive or gap-filling doctrines allow the courts to imply terms restraining some kinds of
35. I sidestep the debate over whether good faith and fair dealing is, on
one hand, a doctrine of interpretation, or, on the other hand, an invitation for
judges to fill gaps in incomplete contracts how they see fit. My arguments are
intended to be compatible with both views. For a recent defense of the view
that good faith and fair dealing holds the parties to the correct interpretation
of their own agreement, see Daniel Markovits, Good Faith As Contract’s Core
Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 272 (Gregory
Klass et al. eds., 2014). For the gap-filling view, see, for example, Koehrer v.
Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he obligations
stemming from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are imposed by law as normative values of society.”); see also Summers, supra note 3,
at 226 (“[Good faith] can fill significant gaps in contracts.”).
36. American courts do not apply the duty to the precontractual phase,
though they will generally enforce an express precontractual agreement to negotiate in good faith. See, e.g., SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d
330, 333–34 (Del. 2013) (reaffirming that an explicit agreement to negotiate in
good faith is enforceable under Delaware law). In some jurisdictions, courts
are willing to find implied agreements to negotiate in good faith once the parties have agreed on major terms but have left other terms open. See Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 507–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(regarding New York law); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661,
664 n.7 (2007) (“[T]hirteen states, sixteen federal district courts, and seven
federal circuits [follow the Tribune approach].”). Even in the absence of an express or implied agreement to negotiate in good faith, American courts sometimes police bad faith conduct using other doctrines, including promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267, 273–75 (Wis.
1965).
37. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (2003) (“All contracts are incomplete.
There are infinite states of the world and the capacities of contracting parties
to condition their future performance on each possible state are finite.”).
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self-interested behavior, even if the parties have not explicitly
written such constraints into their contracts. Perhaps the most
important of these doctrines is the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing.
Below, I chart the divergence between the expansive terms
in which most legislatures and courts have defined the duty of
good faith and fair dealing (Section A) and the limited extent to
which courts have actually enforced the duty (Section B), a divergence that has already been noted by other scholars. I then
explain two common strategies for closing the gap between the
rhetoric of good faith performance and its actual enforcement:
what I call the the “leveling-down” strategy, and the less
popular “leveling-up” strategy (Section C).
A. THE DEFINITIONAL TRIUMPH OF COMMERCIAL
REASONABLENESS
For centuries, the common law generally took a cautious
approach to the idea of good faith in contracts, despite Lord
Mansfield’s claim in the 1760s that good faith is the basis of all
38
contracts and dealings. Until the twentieth century, the notion of good faith appeared most prominently in the common
law in disputes over title to property and negotiable instruments, where it continues to play a crucial role in the doctrine
39
of good faith purchase. In these cases, good faith was, and is,
40
essentially a state of mind—innocence, or lack of notice. Because courts generally refrained from assessing the reasonableness or diligence of a purchaser’s inquiries, good faith was
sometimes known as the rule of the “pure heart and the empty
41
head.” The distinct notion of good faith as a source of duties to
one’s contractual counterparty was limited in the nineteenth
century to fiduciary relations and to certain insurance con42
tracts.
New York appears to have been the first American jurisdiction to embrace good faith performance as a general doc38. Boone v. Eyre, (1789) 126 Eng. Rep. 148 (K.B.); 1 H. Bl. 273; Carter v.
Boehm, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (K.B.) 1164.
39. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666,
668–69 (1963) (distinguishing “good faith purchase” and “good faith performance” under the U.C.C., and noting that the U.C.C.’s recognition of good
faith performance revived a largely forgotten principle from Roman law).
40. See id. at 668.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. b (1981).
42. See McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 170, 185–86
(1828).
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trine. In the 1933 case of Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul Arm44
strong Co., the defendants settled a copyright lawsuit with the
plaintiff by agreeing to pay the plaintiff half of the receipts
from the revival of a play. The agreement gave the plaintiff approval rights over all arrangements, except the motion picture
rights. At the time of the agreement, all motion pictures were
silent. After the advent of talking motion pictures, the defendants sold all the motion picture rights without seeking the
plaintiff’s approval. This course of action was seemingly permitted by the words of the agreement, but the New York Court
of Appeals nevertheless ruled that it was a breach of contract.
The court stated that the defendants had “assumed a fiduciary
45
relationship which had its origin in the contract.” In fact, the
court stressed that there was nothing special about this particular contract; rather,
in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall
do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which
means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good
46
faith and fair dealing.

Over the next twenty-five years, several other jurisdictions
adopted a general duty of good faith and fair dealing, in terms
47
broadly similar to New York’s.
The adoption of the U.C.C. provided a major leap forward
for good faith in American contract law. The U.C.C. itself
43. By contrast, civil law countries allowed good faith a more general role.
For example, section 242 of the German Civil Code, which came into force in
1900, provides that a person subject to an obligation under the Code is
obligated to perform in such a manner as good faith (Treu und Glauben)
requires, taking into account general practice. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH
[BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 1, 1900, as amended Jan. 1, 1992, translated by Simon L. Goren (1994), at xiii, §242 at 41. The German courts have used the
idea of good faith for a variety of creative purposes, including imposing
precontractual liability, protecting third parties, and, most famously, revising
price terms in the wake of the hyperinflation crisis of the 1920s. For an overview, see Werner F. Ebke & Bettina M. Steinhauer, The Doctrine of Good
Faith in German Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW
171 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); see also JOHN P. DAWSON,
THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 461–79 (1968).
44. 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
45. Id. at 166.
46. Id. at 167 (emphasis added). For a similar, earlier statement, see
Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914).
47. See, e.g., World’s Exposition Shows, Inc. v. B.P.O. Elks, 186 So. 721,
723 (Ala. 1939); Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. Press Mfg. Co., 128 P.2d 665,
677 (Cal. 1942); Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat. Bank, 154 N.E.2d 683, 690 (Ill.
1958); Clark v. State St. Trust Co., 169 N.E. 897, 903 (Mass. 1930); Salem
King’s Prods. Co. v. Ramp, 196 P. 401, 409 (Or. 1921).
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provides that “[e]very contract or duty within [the Code]
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
48
enforcement.” In addition to the general requirement, the
Code requires parties to observe a good faith standard in more
49
than fifty specific provisions. Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter and principal architect of the U.C.C., was primarily responsible for the Code’s adoption of a general obligation of good
50
faith. The obligation of good faith was a crucial part of Llewellyn’s more general project of reforming the classical law of contract to bring it into line with the norms generally accepted by
businesspeople, with the aim of ensuring that commercial law
would be flexible enough to keep pace with changes in commer51
cial practice.
Llewellyn also proposed his own definition of good faith
under the Code. Before the Code, the idea of “good faith” was
mostly used as a precondition for a purchaser wishing to assert
good title to an item of property despite the seller’s lack of authority to do so. Debates over how to define the term in that area of law had long focused on whether good faith depended solely on the relevant party’s actual state of mind (a “subjective”
standard) or turned instead on whether the party had complied
with standards of reasonable behavior (an “objective” standard). In keeping with Llewellyn’s expansive vision for commercial law, his initial proposed definition of good faith in the Code
was broad, encompassing both “honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned” and “observance by a person of the
reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in
52
which he is engaged.” But, at least initially, Llewellyn did not
48. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2014).
49. See REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 2002-2003, at 37 (2004); Robert S.
Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 195 n.2 (1968).
50. Llewellyn drew both on existing American precedents and on German
law. See James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on
Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J.
156, 157–58, 162–63, 166–67 (1987) (noting the affinity between Llewellyn’s
vision of commercial law and the views of some nineteenth-century German
legal scholars). Compare supra note 47 (listing some earlier American good
faith cases), with supra note 43 (discussing good faith in German law).
51. In addition to the good faith provisions, Llewellyn was also behind the
Code’s adoption of a lax parol evidence rule and also the Code’s directions to
courts to consider usages of trade, courses of performance, and courses of dealing in contract adjudication. See David G. Epstein et al., Fifty: Shades of
Grey—Uncertainty About Extrinsic Evidence and Parol Evidence After All These UCC Years, 45 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 925, 937–39 (2013).
52. U.C.C. § 1-201(18) (May 1949 Draft).
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entirely get his way when it came to the definition of good faith.
His inclusion of a reasonableness requirement in the draft Code
drew criticism from some practicing lawyers involved in the
U.C.C. project, who objected to the legalization of commercial
morality, and voiced fears that customers would be encouraged
to bring unjustified suits for supposed failures to comply with
53
reasonable standards of behavior. The ABA Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law thus urged a narrower definition of good faith, limited to honesty in fact and “the absence
54
of trickery, deceit or improper purpose.”
The U.C.C.’s drafters adopted a compromise. They agreed
that the Code’s overarching obligation of good faith in the performance and enforcement of commercial obligations should be
55
restricted to “honesty in fact.” But in Article 2, which governs
sales of goods, the drafters applied Llewellyn’s broader view of
good faith to cases where the party performing or enforcing an
obligation was a merchant, requiring merchants to observe
56
“reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” This compromise was ultimately incorporated into the first version of
57
the Code’s Official Text, approved in 1962. And even the seemingly narrower term “honesty in fact” was subject to broad
readings by the Code’s proponents. Commending the Code to
New York’s legislators, Edwin Patterson contended that “honesty in fact” encompassed requirements of “generosity” and “cooperation,” and that it would mitigate the effects of “hard luck”
58
in commerce.
In this form, good faith became a major part of commercial
law in the jurisdictions adopting the U.C.C.—all of the states
59
and the District of Columbia —and the idea soon spread far
53. Walter D. Malcolm et al., Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6 BUS. LAW. 119, 127 (1951) (“Why should the Code draftsmen
tell us to be good? Businessmen, or at least most of them, carry on business
ethically and did so long before the Code was ever conceived. The Code should
not try to prescribe morals.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54. Id. at 128.
55. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1962).
56. Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
57. See id. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b).
58. 1 STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1955, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 310–15 (1955).
59. Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have also adopted the
U.C.C. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), DUKE LAW, https://law
.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/ucc/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). Louisiana has
not adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C., though it has adopted Article 1 and several
other Articles. Uniform Commercial Code Locator, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
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beyond the Code. Robert Summers’s 1968 article on good faith
was an important step along the way to the widespread
60
adoption of a general obligation in American contract law. Us61
ing an idea borrowed from the philosophy of language,
Summers claimed that good faith was an “excluder”—it served
62
to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.
Summers’s own nonexhaustive list of categories of bad faith
performance included: (1) evasion of the spirit of the deal, (2)
lack of diligence and slacking off, (3) willfully rendering only
substantial performance, (4) abuse of a power to specify terms,
(5) abuse of a power to determine compliance, and (6)
interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s
performance. In Summers’s view, the U.C.C.’s general
definition as “honesty in fact” was plainly too narrow, for there
63
are several categories of non-dishonest bad faith.
In turn, Summers’s conception of good faith influenced
64
Robert Braucher, who drafted section 205 of the Restatement.
That provision states that “[e]very contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
65
and its enforcement.” By using both of the U.C.C.’s terms—
”good faith” and “fair dealing”—the Restatement made clear
that the duty extended beyond an honesty requirement. According to the comments to section 205, in the particular context of
contract performance and enforcement, good faith “emphasizes
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
66
the justified expectations of the other party.” Adopting the
“excluder” analysis, the comments continue by saying that good
faith “excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as
involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards
67
of decency, fairness or reasonableness.” Again echoing Sum60. See generally Summers, supra note 49.
61. See J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 70–71 (1962); see also Roland
Hall, Excluders, 20 ANALYSIS 1 (1959) (discussing excluders); cf. Dennis M.
Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance
and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 348–49 (1988)
(criticizing Summers’ application of the philosophical concept of excluders).
62. Summers, supra note 49, at 201.
63. See id. at 204.
64. See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 810
(1982) (“Professor Braucher acknowledged that an article I wrote . . . substantially influenced the recognition and conceptualization of good faith in section
205.”).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
66. Id. § 205 cmt. a.
67. Id.

2015]

GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

2063

mers, the comments state that “[a] complete catalogue of types
of bad faith is impossible,” and recite Summers’s list of types of
68
bad faith conduct as illustrations.
The vast majority of American jurisdictions have adopted
the duty as a matter of general contract law; many have explic69
itly endorsed the Restatement approach. State and federal
statutes governing particular classes of contracts contain
70
similar requirements. Moreover, over time, various amendments to the U.C.C. extended the “objective” standard of com71
mercial reasonableness to various contexts beyond Article 2.
Eventually, the Code’s definition of good faith flipped, so that
commercial reasonableness now constitutes the general rule.
Since 2003, the Official Text of the U.C.C. now essentially reinstates Llewellyn’s definition of good faith, defining the term as
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
72
standards of fair dealing.” Though some states continue to
limit the general definition of good faith in their version of
U.C.C. to “honesty in fact,” most jurisdictions now adopt the
73
broader view as a general matter.
For the most part, then, the American law of good faith
provides that those performing and enforcing contractual obligations must observe standards of “fair dealing” or “commercial
reasonableness.” As envisaged by influential contracts scholars
like Llewellyn and Summers, the good faith duty requires substantial deference to the other party’s interests, beyond what
the terms of the formal document demand. Courts have used a
variety of formulations to reflect the understanding that good
68. Id. § 205 cmt. d.
69. See, e.g., Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 811 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2012) (“The rule that parties to a contract act in good faith is universal.”).
70. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (2012) (providing automobile franchisee
with a cause of action against an automobile manufacturer who fails to “act in
good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or provisions of
the franchise”); Id. § 2802(b)(3)(D) (franchisor terminating franchise arrangement for reason other than franchisee misconduct must do so “in good faith
and the normal course of business”).
71. For example, Article 2A of the U.C.C., which governs leases of goods,
applied the broader standard to merchants from its inception. See U.C.C. § 2A103(4) (2014).
72. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2014). The Code continues to exempt Article 5,
which governs letters of credit, from the commercial reasonableness standard.
Id.
73. See 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 26.8 n.6 (2014), available at LexisNexis CORBIN (noting that as of August 1, 2010, thirty-nine states had adopted
the revised Article 1 of the U.C.C.; twenty-eight of those adopt the broader
general definition of good faith).
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faith and fair dealing involves the incorporation into law of
74
“contractual morality,” opening up the potential for extensive
judicial superintendence of contractual discretion. As scholars
in a long tradition of work on the relational aspects of contract
have shown, the morality of contracting—as perceived by the
participants—pervasively demands cooperation, flexibility, and
some degree of accommodation of the other party’s legitimate
75
interests. Along similar lines, many courts have cited the
Summers-Restatement reference to community standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness as an interpretation of the
76
meaning of good faith and fair dealing. Others say that the
duty prevents parties from frustrating the purpose of the con77
78
tract. Some courts have spoken of a “duty of cooperation.”
Still other courts say that the duty prevents a party from upsetting the other party’s justified, reasonable, or legitimate ex79
pectations. Such expectations may arise from informal norms
and implicit understandings between the parties, not just from
80
the formal contractual documents. Enthusiasts for expansive
views of the duty have endorsed it as a demand for acts of al81
truism toward one’s contractual partner, and as a requirement that one exercise one’s formal entitlements in a spirit of
82
solidarity with the other party. Along similar lines, skeptics of
broad conceptions of good faith have worried that the doctrine
74. Summers used this phrase in his 1968 article. Summers, supra note
49, at 195, 214.
75. Roughly speaking, relational contract theory explores the implications
of the insight that contracts are embedded within a broader set of relations
between the parties, an idea that has been a source of inspiration both for lawand-economics scholarship and for sociological scholarship on contracts. For an
excellent recent overview of relational contract scholarship of both kinds, see
Robert E. Scott, The Promise and Peril of Relational Contract Theory, in
REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY 105 (Jean
Braucher et al. eds., 2013).
76. E.g., Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 557 (Or. 1987).
77. E.g., Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826
P.2d 710, 728 (Cal. 1992).
78. E.g., Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 811 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Wis.
2013); In re Estate of Chayka, 176 N.W.2d 561, 564 n.7 (Wis. 1970).
79. E.g., Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1444 (7th
Cir. 1992) (reasonable expectations); Carma Developers, 826 P.2d at 728 (legitimate expectations).
80. See Joseph Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1369, 1380–81 (2013).
81. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1721 (1976) (in its most altruistic form, good faith
could include a “duty to absorb some loss in order to avoid a larger loss to one’s
contractual partner”).
82. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 210 (1976).
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requires judicial enforcement of the Golden Rule or of Kant’s
83
Categorical Imperative; that it enshrines “commercial Good
84
Samaritanism”; or even that the good faith and fair dealing
85
duty imposes a regime of “commercial palimony.”
The duty of good faith and fair dealing has been invoked in
several thousand cases, often successfully. And the duty has
sometimes served as the basis for strikingly liberal impositions
86
of liability. For example, in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., the
Sixth Circuit invigorated the field of “lender liability” by applying the duty to a bank’s decision to refuse further advances to a
borrower in financial difficulties. Without giving any notice, the
lender dishonored checks drawn by the borrower, and the bor87
rower’s business soon collapsed. Though the text of the parties’ loan agreement seemed to place no limits on the lender’s
discretion to grant or deny a request for further credit, the borrower provided expert testimony stating that a reasonable
lender would at least have given notice of the denial so as to
88
give the borrower time to find alternative sources of financing.
Having been instructed to impose liability if it found the lender
had acted unreasonably when it exercised its discretion to deny
further credit, the jury found a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and awarded the borrower
89
damages of $7.5 million. The Sixth Circuit upheld the ver90
dict. The court stressed that the borrower was at the lender’s
mercy, and that the parties had a long-term banking relation91
ship.

83. White, supra note 7, at 690–91.
84. See Gillette, supra note 6, at 635; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Duty To Rescue in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 666–70 (2002)
(contending, more enthusiastically than Gillette, that some instances of the
duty of good faith performance exemplify a duty to rescue one’s contractual
counterparty).
85. Douglas K. Newell, Will Kindness Kill Contract?, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV.
455, 471 (1995).
86. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
87. Id. at 754.
88. Id. at 759.
89. Id. at 755, 760.
90. Id. at 766.
91. As Steven Burton points out, the K.M.C. decision is an illustration of
relational contract law (to which Burton himself is hostile). Steven J. Burton,
Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1533, 1554 (1994).
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B. THE LIMITED ENFORCEMENT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
Despite the expansive implications of a duty to engage in
commercially reasonable behavior, judicial enforcement practices have usually fallen short of what Llewellyn seemed to intend. It is admittedly difficult to provide a comprehensive account of the case law on good faith performance, because there
is no generally accepted doctrinal framework, and many decisions rely on judicial or jury intuition to distinguish between
good faith and bad faith performance. Still, a large number of
scholars reviewing the case law agree that the reality of enforcement has failed to match good faith’s definitional rheto92
ric. Courts often quickly undercut their own sweeping invocations of commercial reasonableness with statements that the
task of implying terms based on the duty is a “cautious enter93
prise,” or that courts should not be “overly ambitious” when
94
applying the duty. In addition, courts have developed myriad
doctrinal tests to limit the duty’s enforcement. As I explain below, courts often assess defendants’ conduct under deferential
standards of review; they sometimes require plaintiffs to establish improper motive or near-dishonest conduct; they impose
heightened burdens of proof on plaintiffs; and they sometimes
allow pro-defendant norms to trump good faith and fair dealing.
1. Deferential Standards of Review
One way that courts restrict the effectiveness of good faith
and fair dealing is by providing that the reasonableness of a defendant’s contractual performance should be reviewed under a
deferential standard. Rather than decide for themselves what
counts as bad faith or unreasonable behavior, courts explicitly
allow the defendant some degree of latitude. For example,
many courts state that, to ground a claim based on a defendant’s exercise of discretion, the plaintiff must establish that the
95
decision was “arbitrary” or “capricious.”
92. For accounts stressing the divergence between the rhetoric and reality
of enforcement in good faith and fair dealing cases, see Dubroff, supra note 20;
Gillette, supra note 6; Houh, supra note 21; Imwinkelried, supra note 12.
93. Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinatti Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708
A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998).
94. Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1079 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002).
95. See, e.g., Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1132 (N.J.
2001).
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In some cases, courts have applied standards of review
closely equivalent to corporate law’s business judgment rule. In
corporate law, the business judgment rule involves the presumption that the Board of Directors acted independently, with
due care, in good faith, and in the honest belief that its actions
96
were in the stockholders’ best interests. The rule shields directors and officers from liability for failure to take due care
where the challenged decision can be attributed to any rational
business purpose; effectively, the rule limits liability to extreme
97
cases. A similar approach emerges from a review of franchise
litigation under various statutory and common-law good faith
duties. Though one court in California has found a contractual
provision unconscionable on the ground that it superimposed
the business judgment rule on the duty of good faith and fair
98
dealing, many franchise cases have actually applied something very like the business judgment rule when reviewing
franchisor discretion, even without a contractual provision to
99
that effect.
Courts also constrain the good faith and fair dealing
standard by superimposing doctrinal requirements in specified
contexts to restrict the scope of a reasonableness test. The Supreme Court of Nevada’s decision in Davis v. Nevada National
100
Bank, a lender liability case, provides an example. The defendant bank granted the plaintiffs a loan to finance the con101
struction of their new home. Rather than simply advancing
the money to the plaintiff, the bank reserved the power to dis102
burse the funds to the builder. As construction progressed,
the plaintiffs noticed serious structural defects in the foundation, and implored the bank to stop doling out their cash to the
103
builder. Yet the bank continued to make advances, squander-

96. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984).
97. Id.
98. Vlahos v. Int’l Baking Co., No. A102335, 2005 WL 1632089, at *8 (Cal.
Ct. App. July 12, 2005).
99. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the
Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 984–85 (1990) (many
courts have applied something like a business judgment approach to adjudicating good faith claims in franchise cases); Jeffrey C. Selman, Applying the
Business Judgment Rule to the Franchise Relationship, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 111
(2000) (advocating explicit adoption of a business judgment rule by analogy to
corporate law).
100. 737 P.2d 503 (Nev. 1987).
101. Id. at 504.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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ing the plaintiffs’ money on a fundamentally defective house.
The bank’s conduct was certainly commercially unreasonable,
but that alone was not enough to ground a claim. While accept105
ing that the bank was under a duty of care, the court took
pains to reject the idea of a general legally enforceable duty on
the bank’s part to exercise care in the disbursement of the
106
loan. It crafted more restrictive conditions for the duty to be
applied by the jury, stating that “it would be unjust to permit a
lender, with impunity, to simply disregard a borrower’s complaint of substantial construction deficiencies affecting the
107
structural integrity of a project.” A genuine attempt to impose
a full-blooded standard of commercial reasonableness would
not stop there.
2. Requiring Proof of Bad Motive or Borderline Duplicity
As we have seen, at the level of definitional rhetoric, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be breached by objectively unreasonable conduct, regardless of the actor’s motive
108
or mental state. But courts have nevertheless developed doctrinal tests that focus the inquiry on the defendant’s state of
109
mind. Even where courts purport to apply an “objective”
standard, they often require the plaintiff to establish an improper motive or borderline dishonesty. In this way, courts fall
short of what a true attempt to enforce a norm of commercial
reasonableness would involve.
Again, franchise cases provide examples of this process.
Courts adjudicating challenges by franchisees to the discretionary decisions of franchisors often impose a requirement of
110
improper motive. In Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., for example, a gas station franchisee complained that the franchisor
had exercised its discretion to raise prices so drastically that it
104. Id.
105. Id. at 505.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see also id. at 506.
108. E.g., Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826
P.2d 710, 727 (Cal. 1992) (“Dishonesty presupposes subjective immorality; the
covenant of good faith can be breached for objectively unreasonable conduct . . . .”).
109. Sometimes statutory definitions of bad faith make clear that a defendant will be liable only for specified forms of wrongdoing. For example, the
Automobile Dealer’s Day in Court Act limits actionable conduct to “coercion,
intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party.” 15
U.S.C. § 1221(e); see also, e.g., Paccar Inc. v. Elliot Wilson Capitol Trucks LLC,
905 F. Supp. 2d 675, 685 (D. Md. 2012).
110. 773 A.2d 1121 (N.J. 2001).
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drove the franchisee out of business. The court ruled that the
franchisee would only be entitled to damages under the duty of
good faith and fair dealing if it could show that the franchisor
111
had acted from a “bad motive.” The court remanded the case
for further discovery on the issue of whether the franchisor had
acted with the intention of putting the franchisee out of
business—an allegation the court admitted would be “difficult
112
to prove.”
Sometimes, courts demand proof of something very close to
dishonesty when applying the supposedly “objective” standard
of good faith and fair dealing. One particularly well-known example is Judge Posner’s opinion in Market Street Associates v.
113
Frey. The case involved a real estate sale and leaseback
transaction, originally entered into for financing purposes
114
between a retail tenant and a landlord in 1968. The lease
entitled the tenant to ask the landlord to finance repairs to the
115
property. The contract also stated that, if negotiations over
financing the requested improvements failed, the tenant could
116
repurchase the property at a price determined by a formula.
Almost twenty years later, a new tenant requested financing to
117
build a new store. At this time, the contract’s price formula
evidently offered the tenant a knock-down price for the proper118
ty. The landlord rejected the financing request out of hand,
having forgotten the extreme consequences of a failure of
119
negotiations. Seeking to avoid the automatic sale provision,
120
the landlord invoked the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Judge Posner applied a narrow conception of the duty’s
requirements. He accepted that it would be inconsistent with
good faith to “take deliberate advantage of an oversight by your
121
contract partner concerning his rights under the contract.”
The dispositive question, on Judge Posner’s view, was “simply
whether [the tenant] tried to trick [the landlord] and succeeded

111. Id. at 1130–31.
112. Id. at 1131.
113. 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never
Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1357, 1359–60 (2009).
114. Mkt. St. Assocs., 941 F.2d at 591.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 591–93.
121. Id. at 594.
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123

in doing so.” As Todd Rakoff has shown, Judge Posner’s
opinion does not explain convincingly why his “anti-trickery”
reading of good faith and fair dealing is preferable to the
District Court’s finding that the duty simply required the tenant to notify the landlord of the contract’s terms as a precondition for seeking to invoke them. But Judge Posner’s view is in
keeping with a series of other judicial opinions—including his
124
own —stating that good faith and fair dealing does not
necessarily entail the judicial enforcement of commercial
reasonableness, even though legislatures and courts often
express the norm in those terms.
3. Imposing Heightened Evidentiary Burdens
Another way that courts discourage resort to the duty of
good faith and fair dealing is by erecting evidentiary hurdles in
front of plaintiffs who seek to invoke it. The most explicit example comes from government contract litigation. The federal
common law of government contracting recognizes the implied
125
duty of good faith and fair dealing. But where a private contractor claims a breach, courts apply a strong presumption that
126
government officials acted in good faith. That presumption
can be overcome only if the plaintiff provides “well-nigh irrefra127
gable proof,” or, in more modern language, “clear and con128
vincing evidence,” of bad faith. The application of this heavy
presumption of good faith to the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing appears to be the product of historical confu129
sion. Nevertheless, it seems to have survived a recent judicial
122. Id. at 596. On remand, the District Court conducted a bench trial, and
ruled that there was a breach of the duty of good faith even under Judge
Posner’s restrictive standard. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 817 F. Supp.
784, 788 (E.D. Wis. 1993), aff’d 21 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 1994).
123. Todd D. Rakoff, Good Faith in Contract Performance: Market Street
Associates v. Frey, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (2007).
124. E.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that reasonableness is
not the test for good faith).
125. See, e.g., Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
126. See Bryan O. Ramos, Never Say Die: The Continued Existence of the
Government Officials’ Good Faith Presumption in Federal Contracting Law
and the Well-Nigh Irrefragable Proof Standard After Tecom, 63 A.F. L. REV.
163 (2009).
127. Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1323
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
128. Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239–
40 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
129. See Stuart B. Nibley & Jade Totman, Let the Government Contract:

2015]

GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

2071

attempt to confine it to cases where “a government official is
accused of fraud or quasi-criminal wrongdoing in the exercise of
130
his official duties,” and continues to apply to ordinary breach131
es of the implied covenant by the federal government.
A heightened evidentiary burden makes it particularly difficult to establish a breach of good faith when it is combined, as
it often appears to be, with a requirement of proof of improper
132
motive. Plaintiffs do sometimes prevail in government contracting suits based on the implied covenant. In one recent
case, the judge made a finding of bad faith, having reviewed internal communications among officials and concluded the
plaintiff had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that a
number of Army officials had engaged in a “prolonged cam133
paign to harm” the plaintiff. But a plaintiff will generally
need to engage in extensive and costly discovery to find the
necessary degree of proof, and, as a result, many government
contractors presumably decide not to file suit at all.
4. Giving Precedence to Other Legal Norms
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is supposedly implied in every contract, giving rise to the potential for conflict
with other implied contract law norms. In particular, the good
faith norm conflicts with the general American rule of at-will
employment, under which employment under an indefinite con134
tract of employment can be terminated for any reason, or for
no reason at all. The dominant trend is to subordinate the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing in the field of employment
terminations.
It once appeared that the new contract law duty would
take precedence over the at-will norm. In a series of decisions
135
in the 1970s and 1980s, several courts applied the SummersThe Sovereign Has the Right, and Good Reason, To Shed Its Sovereignty When
It Contracts, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1 (2012).
130. Tecom, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 736, 769 (2005).
131. See Road & Highway Builders, LLC v. United States, 702 F.3d 1365,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that presumption of good faith
should be limited to fraud or quasi-criminal wrongdoing); Nibley & Totman,
supra note 129 at 24; Ramos, supra note 126, at 165–66.
132. See, e.g., Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817,
829–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010); D’Andrea Bros. LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 205,
222 (2010).
133. N. Star Alaska Hous. Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 158 (2007).
134. Other than those reasons barred by antidiscrimination statutes.
135. E.g., Hoffman La-Roche v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 738 (Ala. 1987);
K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987); Hall v. Farmers
Ins. Exch. 713 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Okla. 1985); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d
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Restatement logic to employment terminations as an exception
to the rule of at-will employment. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court explicitly linked the emerging norm against bad
faith termination of an at-will employment contract to the Re136
statement’s provision on good faith and fair dealing. The jury
had held for the plaintiff based on a theory of bad faith termination, in a case where the employer had fired a salesman for
the purpose of depriving him of bonuses to which he was about
137
to become entitled. The court upheld the verdict even though
the literal words of the contract gave the employer the power to
138
terminate the contract without cause at any time.
But the tide has turned against the application of the good
faith norm to terminations of indefinite employment arrangements. Faced with a conflict of norms, the majority of states
simply award victory to the at-will norm; they do not permit
139
the implied covenant to operate. Courts rejecting the duty in
the employment setting claim that the implied covenant is just
140
too vague (a somewhat unconvincing contention, given that
the covenant applies to every other contract), or find that it is
simply incoherent to have a rule of at-will employment while
simultaneously restricting that doctrine with a duty of good
141
faith and fair dealing. In the at-will employment setting,
then, even proof of bad-faith motive will generally not ground a
claim for breach of contract. Even the states that originally recognized the application of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in this field have “circumscribed the covenant’s impact in
142
what amount to expressions of judicial remorse.” The Supreme Court of California, for example, now says that, notwithstanding the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an at-will
employer “may act peremptorily, arbitrarily, or inconsistently,
without providing specific protections such as prior warning,
1000, 1006–07 (Alaska 1983); Cleary v. Am. Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,
445 (Ct. App. 1980); Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256
(Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
136. Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
137. Id. at 1253.
138. Id. at 1258.
139. See James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in American Employment Law, 32 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 773, 773–74 (2011).
140. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis.
1983) (describing the concept of bad faith as amorphous).
141. See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987)
(explaining that implying a duty of good faith and fair dealing that restricts an
employer’s right to terminate at will would be inconsistent).
142. Brudney, supra note 139, at 774.
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fair procedures, objective evaluation, or preferential reassign143
ment.”
C. PROPOSALS TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN RHETORIC AND
REALITY
Scholars seeking to make sense of this area of contract law
have assumed that courts must bring the rhetoric of good faith
into line with the reality of enforcement—or vice versa. Among
those skeptical of broad judicial pronouncements, doubts about
full-blooded enforcement of good faith and fair dealing find an
intellectual foundation in the “neoformalist” trend in contracts
144
scholarship. The duty of good faith and fair dealing was a
product of the realist and contextualist reaction to classical
formalism, so it is no surprise that it has come under fire from
neoformalists both on the bench and in academia. Robert Scott,
for example, contends that the cost of having courts discern
commercial reasonableness exceeds any benefits it could bring
145
to the parties. Lisa Bernstein, another critic of the U.C.C.’s
strategy of incorporating commercial reasonableness, concludes
that the idea of good faith plays only a very minor role in
private arbitration systems chosen by commercial parties to
146
adjudicate their own disputes.
The most obvious implication of these arguments is that
courts should “level down” the rhetoric of good faith to reflect
the limited reality of enforcement. In their strongest form, lev143. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1110 (Cal. 2000).
144. For overviews of contract law neoformalism, see David Charny, The
New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842 (1999); William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 971
(2001).
145. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1688 (2003) (arguing that “an attempt to enforce
deliberately incomplete contracts by adopting a broad standard of reasonableness or good faith is socially inefficient”).
146. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking
the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765,
1775–76 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law] (stating that arbitrators for the National Grain and Feed Association never rely on a general duty
of good faith, though conceding that the term “good faith” is used in some arbitration decisions); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1734 (2001) (claiming that “notions of good faith and fairness do not appear to affect case outcomes” under private arbitration in the
cotton industry). Bernstein admits that notions of good faith and substantive
fairness “may . . . influence the outcome of arbitration cases in ways that cannot be detected by reading opinions.” Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra, at 1776
n.37.
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eling-down accounts argue that courts and legislatures should
147
abandon the good faith and fair dealing norm. A slightly less
direct way to level down the duty is to pay lip service to it, but
to tie the contours of the duty to the literal words of the
contract’s text. A basic starting point for the duty of good faith
and fair dealing is that the contract’s written words do not
148
provide an exhaustive guide to the contract’s terms.
Yet
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2,
Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting states another view of good faith
149
and fair dealing’s meaning. The case concerned an attempt to
subordinate a lender’s claim in bankruptcy for inequitable
conduct, based on conduct broadly similar to the conduct at
150
issue in the Sixth Circuit’s K.M.C. decision discussed above.
Judge Easterbrook took the opportunity to disagree with
K.M.C., stating that “[u]nless pacts are enforced according to
their terms, the institution of contract, with all the advantages
151
private negotiation and agreement brings, is jeopardized.”
Accordingly, he continued, parties must be allowed to enforce
the terms of their agreement “to the letter, even to the great
discomfort of their trading partners, without being mulcted for
152
lack of ‘good faith.’” For Judge Easterbrook, the borrower had
no hope of establishing bad faith, because the text of the
contract afforded a discretion to the lender without explicitly
153
limiting that discretion. Good faith, he said, cannot “block
147. See Dubroff, supra note 20 (concluding that fair contracts should “be
enforced without the uncertainties that would be created by enabling a party
disadvantaged by enforcement of the deal to claim bad faith as a defense”);
Victor Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in
Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319 (2002) (contending that courts are illequipped to police exercises of discretion in long-term contracts); Mark
Snyderman, Comment, What’s So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith
Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1338
(1988) (arguing that imposing an obligation of good faith in the commercial
lending context “upset[s] the reasonable expectations of the parties and significantly limit[s] the flexibility available to lenders and borrowers in furtherance
of commercial transactions”).
148. See Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank
Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503, 523 (1991) (explaining that
under the U.C.C. “[t]he concept of agreement is not limited to the terms of the
parties’ writing: it includes a variety of elements, all of which must be synthesized” (footnote omitted)).
149. Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d
1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 86–91.
151. Kham, 908 F.2d at 1357.
152. Id.
153. See id. (“Debtor and Bank signed a contract expressly allowing the
Bank to cease making further advances. . . . The Bank exercised its contractu-
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[the] use of terms that actually appear in the contract.”
As Judge Antonin Scalia once explained, the upshot of a
strongly textualist approach would be “virtually to read the
155
doctrine of good faith . . . out of existence.”
Though the
textualist approach to good faith has not completely swept the
156
157
board, it has had some effect on judicial decisions. In particular cases, the contract’s express language is said to preclude
the plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the good faith and fair dealing
158
norm. Even in jurisdictions that often give effect to the duty
of good faith, strongly textualist statements appear
159
spasmodically.
Courts sometimes say that “[t]he implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to assuring
compliance with the express terms of the contract, and cannot
be extended to create obligations not contemplated by the
160
contract.” In a recent case decided under Pennsylvania law, a
federal district court judge even refused to give any effect to an
express covenant of good faith and fair dealing, requiring the
161
plaintiff to establish a breach of some other express term.
al privilege after loaning Debtor $75,000; it made a clean break and did not
demand improved terms. It had the right to do this for any reason satisfactory
to itself.”).
154. Id.
155. Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153–54 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
156. For example, in July 2013, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided
Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 842 N.W.2d 240 (Wis. 2013). The majority
decision permitted a claim based on the covenant to proceed, despite an absence of explicit textual warrant for the claimed duty. Id. at 257. The majority
disapproved of approaches to interpretation that follow “the letter but not the
spirit of an agreement.” Id. at 250. The dissent, with approving citations to
Judge Easterbrook, complained that majority was overriding the contract’s
express text. Id. at 262–64 (Gableman, J., dissenting).
157. See In re Facebook PPC Adver. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (finding that an express term of contract placing risk of improper
actions by a third party on one of the contracting parties precluded a good
faith and fair dealing claim seeking to reallocate that risk); Imwinkelried, supra note 12, at 11–12; Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy,
and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1223–24 (1999).
158. See Facebook, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 770.
159. See, e.g., Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 431
N.W.2d 721, 726 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (“[W]here, as here, a contracting party
complains of acts of the other party which are specifically authorized in their
agreement, we do not see how there can be any breach of the covenant of good
faith.”).
160. See, e.g., Pasadena Live, LLC v. City of Pasadena, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233,
237 (2004).
161. Sheinman Provisions, Inc. v. Nat’l Deli, LLC, No. 08-cv-453, 2008 WL
2758029, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2008); see also Benchmark Group, Inc. v.
Penn Tank Lines, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 2d 562, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (extending the
same error to a case based on the implied covenant).
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Though subsequent courts applying the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing have explicitly rejected the court’s
162
error, the fact that a federal judge could make such a mistake
is a strong indication of the doctrine’s vulnerability to
textualist claims.
Relatedly, many courts recite the claim that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing provides no “independent” or “sepa163
rate” cause of action. Sometimes, courts use this language to
make the relatively uncontroversial point that a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing generally provides a
164
claim for breach of contract, not a tort claim. Similarly, courts
have also used the same idea at the pleading stage to clarify
that a suit based on good faith and fair dealing is a species of
claim for breach of contract, not an alternative cause of ac165
tion. But for many courts, the “no independent cause of action” line—like the textualist approach—has become a piece of
boilerplate doctrine, to be deployed when rejecting claims that
do not find judicial favor.
An alternative reaction to the disparity between rhetoric
and reality in good faith is to hold the rhetoric constant, while
advocating an increase in enforcement activity to match that
rhetoric. In commercial cases, this “leveling-up” strategy is exemplified by Richard Speidel’s argument that courts should
seek out and enforce implicit relational norms under the doctrine of good faith performance, using the doctrine to lend judicial force to requirements that parties cooperate, share risks,
162. See, e.g., Kamco Indus. Sales, Inc. v. Lovejoy, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d
416, 426 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
163. See, e.g., CapitalSource Fin. LLC v. Pittsfield Weaving Co., 571 F.
Supp. 2d 668, 673 (D. Md. 2006); Bay Fireworks, Inc. v. Frenkel & Co., 359 F.
Supp. 2d 257, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The Permanent Editorial Board added a
similar statement to the commentary on the Code. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD.
FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: COMMENTARY NO. 10 (SECTION 1-203) FINAL DRAFT 4
(1994).
164. See, e.g., Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 894 A.2d 335, 345–46
(Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (stating that a “claim brought pursuant to a contract,
alleging a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, sounds
in contract” and was therefore subject to the statute of limitations for breach
of contract claims); Littlejohn v. Parrish, 839 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ohio Ct. App.
2005) (noting the “prevailing view” that “the good-faith-and-fair-dealing requirement is part of the contract—not a separate tort claim”).
165. See, e.g., ICD Holdings S.A. v. Frankel, 976 F. Supp 234, 243–44
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that when conduct that allegedly violates the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also the predicate for breach of an
express contract provision, the breach of good faith claim will be dismissed as
redundant).
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and act in ways that preserve the parties’ relationship. Another “leveling-up” argument is to be found in Emily Houh’s
contention that courts should ramp up their enforcement practices to bring them into line with an expansive vision of societal
167
equality. Houh argues that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing should be used to provide remedies to victims of unconscious gender and racial subordination in the contracting process, even where remedies under civil rights statutes are una168
vailable in such cases. Yet another version of the “levelingup” strategy is Chunlin Leonhard’s argument that courts
should use the good faith and fair dealing doctrine to combat “a
169
business culture of everyone for themselves.” Leonhard contends that courts adjudicating claims under the doctrine should
impose liability where a reasonable person would find the conduct unacceptable, and that courts should have the power to
impose tort damages in the event of a breach of this negligence
170
standard.
II. UNDERENFORCED LEGAL NORMS
Though in one sense their positions are diametrically opposed, advocates of the leveling-down and leveling-up strategies share a common assumption. Both sides assume that the
scope of the good faith and fair dealing norm is, or should be,
coextensive with judicial enforcement of that norm. In this way,
partisans on both sides are characteristic of contracts scholars
more generally; the idea that a legal norm can be valid beyond
the boundaries of judicial enforcement is unfamiliar in con171
tracts scholarship. But the idea has a respectable intellectual
provenance in other legal fields, and finds support in writings
on general jurisprudence. So, in this Part, I begin the process of
defending my claim that good faith and fair dealing is an
166. See Speidel, supra note 21, at 796–77.
167. See Houh, supra note 21.
168. Id. at 1029.
169. Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening
the Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 621, 622 (2011).
170. Id. at 635–36. Leonhard also advocates the extension of good faith and
fair dealing to the pre-contractual phase. Id.
171. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 22 (explaining that contract theorists view
contract law as either conferring a power or imposing a duty). One possible
exception to this generalization is an article by Emily Sherwin on remedies for
breach of contract, which uses a somewhat similar idea to bridge the gap between the rhetoric of remedies for breach of contract and the reality of judicial
enforcement. Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50
MD. L. REV. 253, 300–14 (1991) (the disparity between rights and remedies in
contract law gives rise to “acoustic separation”).
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underenforced legal norm by reaching outside the law of contracts.
The best-known discussion of divergences between legal
norms and the rules for their enforcement in the American legal literature is probably Meir Dan-Cohen’s article on criminal
172
law. Dan-Cohen shows that we can understand legal rules as
being addressed to two audiences: rules addressed to the general public, and rules addressed to legal officials in their capac173
ity as legal officials. A law against theft, as Bentham long ago
pointed out, can be understood as saying both “[l]et no man
steal” and “[l]et the judge cause whoever is convicted of stealing
174
to be hanged.” In Dan-Cohen’s terminology, the former is a
“conduct rule” for citizens to follow; the latter is a “decision
175
rule” for courts to apply. Typically, conduct rules and decision
rules correspond in criminal law, in that courts follow a decision rule requiring them to impose sanctions in the event of any
breach of a given conduct rule.
But, Dan-Cohen shows, it is logically possible for gaps to
open up between conduct rules and decision rules. So, in the
hypothetical example on which Dan-Cohen focuses, criminal
law might contain a conduct rule that intentional killing is for176
bidden, even in circumstances of necessity. Simultaneously,
however, the law might contain a decision rule that shields a
177
necessitous killer from conviction. In addition to exposing the
logical possibility of divergence between conduct rules and decision rules, Dan-Cohen’s article explores the legitimacy of hiding
178
such divergences from the general populace. But the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules is not itself premised on deception; divergences between conduct rules and decision rules might be openly acknowledged and communicated to
citizens. Though Dan-Cohen does not use the term
“underenforcement,” his necessity-as-a-defense-to-murder example is an illustration of an underenforced conduct rule: the
law defines as murder, and forbids, killing in necessitous circumstances, but no legal sanctions will attach to the violation
172. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 23.
173. Id. at 627.
174. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 113, 430 (Wilfrid Harrison ed.,
1948) (emphasis omitted).
175. Dan-Cohen, supra note 23.
176. See id. at 637–39 (presenting the hypothetical necessity example).
177. See id.
178. Id. at 665–77.
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of the rule where the judge or jury finds that the defendant acted out of necessity.
A. UNDERENFORCED NORMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Though the conduct rule-decision rule distinction has been
179
deployed fruitfully in criminal law, constitutional law is the
site of the most elaborate scholarly work—so much so that
there is an accepted genre of scholarship adopting a “constitu180
tional decision rules” model. Scholars adopting this model
draw a distinction between, on the one hand, what the Constitution requires or authorizes (i.e., conduct rules, referred to in
the literature as “constitutional meaning” or “constitutional op181
erative propositions” ) and, on the other hand, judicial doctrines whose function is to implement those conduct rules (i.e.,
182
decision rules, or “implementing doctrines”). For the most
part, the text of the Constitution leaves the task of devising decision rules to the courts. Most constitutional adjudication does
not involve interpretation of the constitutional text, so much as
the development of “a substructure of substantive, procedural,
and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority
183
from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions.”
On this view, constitutional law doctrine implements, but does
not always track, the norms set forth in the Constitution itself.
Working in this vein, Richard Fallon has defended the “permissible disparity thesis”—the claim that “a [justifiable] gap frequently exists between constitutional meaning and judicially
184
enforced doctrine.” Where constitutional conduct rules extend
to a broader degree of circumstances than those reached by the
corresponding decision rule, the effect is an underenforced con185
stitutional norm.
179. See Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 730 (1990) (using a criminal law example to illustrate this distinction).
180. For an extensive review, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
181. For reasons mostly specific to constitutional law, Mitchell Berman
prefers the term “constitutional operative propositions” to “conduct rules.” Id.
at 58–59 n.192. I will stick with “conduct rules” to preserve symmetry with the
rest of the paper.
182. Id. at 57–58.
183. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57 (1997).
184. Fallon, supra note 26, 1278–79, 1317.
185. Outside the United States, one can find even clearer examples of unenforced constitutional duties. For example, the Irish Constitution requires
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1. Underenforcement and Political Questions
Let’s begin with the clearest example of judicial
underenforcement of legal norms in American constitutional
186
law, the political question doctrine. When a plaintiff brings
an action seeking relief on the basis that the defendant’s action
violated the Constitution, or that a legislative enactment under
which the defendant acted is unconstitutional, the defendant
may respond in several ways. Most straightforwardly, the defendant can join the issue on the merits, and rebut the claim of
unconstitutionality. But, alternatively, the defendant can respond that the claim should be dismissed because it raises a
nonjusticiable political question. When a court dismisses a constitutional claim on the ground that it raises a nonjusticiable
political question, the court does not say that the defendant has
not violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rather, the
187
court simply declines to decide the issue. At least sometimes,
then, courts must be rejecting valid constitutional claims.
In political question cases, the reasons for declining to enforce the Constitution to its fullest extent stem from the institutional features of courts. The Supreme Court’s decision in
188
Vieth v. Jubilirer is a particularly clear illustration of the
point. The plaintiffs complained that the defendants had engaged in partisan gerrymandering in drawing electoral districts, and claimed that the defendants’ conduct violated the
Constitution. Writing for the plurality in Vieth, Justice Scalia
assumed, for the sake of argument, that “an excessive injection
of politics [into the redistricting process] is unlawful” under the
189
Equal Protection Clause. He maintained nonetheless that the
federal courts should not even try to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims. Legislatures, he said, can pass laws that
are “inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc,” but, “law pronounced
by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon rea190
soned distinctions.” Accordingly, courts must develop “judithe legislature to apply “directive principles of social policy,” including socioeconomic rights, while explicitly providing that these principles “shall not be
cognisable by any Court under any of the provisions of this Constitution.” IR.
CONST., 1937, art. 45. Conversely, courts sometimes engage in
“overenforcement,” by adopting prophylactic rules to protect constitutional
rights. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1303–06.
186. See Sager, supra note 32, at 1224–25; see also Fallon, supra note 26,
1280–97.
187. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993).
188. See generally 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
189. Id. at 293 (emphasis omitted).
190. Id. at 278.
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cially discernible and manageable standards” for adjudicating
191
claims. Justice Scalia reviewed various proposed doctrinal
tests for partisan gerrymandering claims, and found that none
provided sufficient guidance to courts to save them from confusion and arbitrariness. Sometimes, and, for the majority of the
Supreme Court, Vieth was one of those times, “the judicial department has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness—because the question is entrusted to one of the political
192
branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights.”
Leaving aside the particular claim of nonjusticiability in
Vieth, the case shows that the absence of judicially manageable
standards sometimes leads to a gap between the constitutional
conduct rule (in this case, the norm of equal protection) and the
decision rules applied by courts. In at least some instances,
constitutional underenforcement may well be justified, for precisely the kinds of institutional reasons the Supreme Court has
offered in support of it. Broadly speaking, these reasons stem
from concerns about the court’s limited expertise and its own
lack of direct democratic legitimacy. In addition to a desire for
judicially manageable standards, the Supreme Court has given
the following reasons that may support a finding that a case
raises a nonjusticiable political question: “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political branch”; “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government”; “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”; “or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro193
nouncements by various departments on one question.” None
of these institutional reasons affects the validity of a constitutional norm invoked by a plaintiff. Rather, each of these reasons bears on the suitability of the judiciary determining
whether or not the government actor has violated that norm.
It is often meaningful to say that an action is unconstitutional, even if no court will ever rule on the issue. Government
officials should follow the Constitution whether or not their
acts can be challenged in court. For example, many recent actions by executive officials engaged in counterterrorism efforts
will probably never be challenged in a court of law because of
the political question doctrine, standing doctrines, and executive immunity doctrines (another significant source of judicial
191. Id.
192. Id. at 277.
193. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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underenforcement). But a claim of unconstitutionality has significant resonance in the court of public opinion, and at least
some officials consider themselves bound in conscience to act
within the Constitution’s limits. For these reasons, officials
take great pains to convince themselves and others—often implausibly—that their actions are compliant with the Constitution and other binding sources of law, even where there is no
194
prospect of judicially imposed sanctions.
2. Subtler Examples of Underenforcement: Doctrinal Tests
The examples in the previous section provide relatively obvious examples of constitutional conduct rules extending beyond the boundaries of judicial decision rules. But constitutional law doctrine contains many subtler, less openly
acknowledged, forms of underenforcement. In constitutional adjudication, interpretation of the Constitution’s text is pervasively supplemented by doctrinal tests devised by the Supreme
Court. These doctrinal tests supply precisely the kinds of judicially manageable standards identified in the political question
jurisprudence as a precondition of enforcement by the courts.
Yet the very same standards often entail partial
underenforcement of the conduct rules they implement.
The most obvious kinds of doctrinal test that give rise to
underenforcement are those explicitly mandating deference to
other governmental institutions. For example, in due process
challenges to disciplinary actions by prison authorities, courts
will reject the claim so long as “some evidence” supports the
195
disciplinary action. This doctrinal test means that, so long as
the record contains some indication of justifiability, a prisoner
who is innocent of the alleged misconduct, and whose punishment was motivated by malice, has no judicially cognizable due
196
process claim. Similarly, courts adopt a a principle of judicial
deference to military regulations on the ground that judges are
197
often ill-equipped to second-guess military decisions. Where
courts defer to a legislative or executive actor’s determination
in the course of assessing the constitutionality of its action,
194. See Frederick Schauer, Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining
“Law” (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2013-11, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220923.
195. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of “Some Evidence”, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631, 633 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. See Fallon, supra note 26 at 1299–300.
197. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1981).
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courts must, at least sometimes, be leaving actual constitutional violations unremedied.
The example on which I will focus is perhaps the grandest
constitutional norm: the Equal Protection Clause. While equal
protection claims are sometimes completely excluded from a
198
given field under the political question doctrine, they are
more often subjected to more understated forms of
199
underenforcement. The Clause provides simply that “no state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
200
protection of the laws.” But equal protection litigation does
not proceed simply by laying the government action side by side
with the text of the Clause and checking for consistency. First,
the Clause itself requires interpretation to discern its meaning.
The Supreme Court has said that the Clause is “a direction
201
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
The Clause may mean that a state may only treat persons dif202
ferently when it is fair to do so, or that the government may
not classify individuals in ways not reasonably designed to
203
promote a legitimate state interest, or that the government
may not engage in discrimination that shows a lack of equal
204
concern and respect for a particular group. No interpretation
commands universal assent, and plausible interpretations of
the Equal Protection Clause tend to be both highly demanding
and vague.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has developed decision rules for equal protection cases. In the courts, advocacy is
generally structured around that judicially created doctrinal
framework. The Supreme Court’s main doctrinal tool in equal
protection cases involves sorting measures into three different
boxes: those deserving strict scrutiny, those deserving intermediate scrutiny, and those subject only to rational basis review.
Racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, whereby the
government is under a burden to establish that the action is
205
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. Clas198. See generally, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
199. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1297–98; Sager, supra note 32, at 1215–
20; see also Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72
MINN. L. REV. 311, 315–26 (1987).
200. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
201. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
202. E.g., Sager, supra note 32, at 1215.
203. See Berman, supra note 180, at 9.
204. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119
HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (2006).
205. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
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sifications based on gender are subject to an intermediate form
of scrutiny, under which the government must show a substan206
tial relationship to an important government interest. But
heightened scrutiny of either kind is exceptional; most government actions are subject only to rational basis review. Under
rational basis review, government action is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging the action will prevail only if she establishes that it bears no rational relationship to any
207
legitimate governmental objective.
These tiers of review cannot seriously be defended as form208
ing part of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, they are constitutional decision rules, justifiable (if at all)
only by reference to the Supreme Court’s perception of its institutional competence and, relatedly, to the perceived need to defer to legislative will for reasons of legitimacy. Starting with
the assumption that racial classifications are especially unlikely to be justified, the court applies strict scrutiny in such cases
so that it can “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to war209
rant use of a highly suspect tool.” The rational basis test,
conversely, is a “‘salutary principle of judicial decision,’” among
the “self-imposed restraints intended to protect [the Supreme
Court] and the state against irresponsible exercise of [the Su210
preme Court’s] unappealable power.” All statutes discriminate among people, but the fairness of such classifications is
211
best left primarily to the political process. In the vast array of
551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
206. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (the justification for a gender-based classification must be “exceedingly persuasive”); id. at
559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[A] gender-based classification must bear a
close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
207. See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2079–80
(2012).
208. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1297–98 (“None of these tests tracks the
language of the Equal Protection Clause, nor has the Supreme Court attempted to link them to the original historical understanding.”); Berman, supra note
180, at 82 (noting that it is “hard to imagine that the strict scrutiny test constitutes any part of the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause”).
209. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
210. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247 (1970) (the rational basis test in
equal protection cases is “a limitation stemming, not from the Fourteenth
Amendment itself, but from the nature of judicial review”).
211. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); cf. JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105 (1980)
(“[R]ights like [those in the First Amendment], whether or not they are explicitly mentioned, must nonetheless be protected, strenuously so, because they

2015]

GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

2085

cases subject only to rational basis review, the constitutional
norm of equal protection—whatever it means—is substantially
212
underenforced in the courts.
Another important feature of equal protection litigation is
213
its focus on governmental purpose or motive. Sometimes, the
Supreme Court’s focus on the government actor’s motive favors
plaintiffs. Even in cases formally governed by rational basis review, the Supreme Court has sometimes struck down measures
because they were motivated by animus toward an unpopular
group. This form of review began in United States Department
214
of Agriculture v. Moreno, a challenge to Congress’s decision to
deny food stamps to individuals who lived in households with
other unmarried adults to whom they were not related. Though
a rational basis could surely be found for Congress’s action, the
Supreme Court concluded that the measure was aimed at discriminating against hippies, and, on that basis, found a viola215
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. Subsequent decisions
have held unconstitutional measures motivated by animus to216
ward undocumented children, people with mental disabili217
218
ties, and gay people.
More often, however, the Supreme Court’s focus on motive
redounds to the government’s benefit. To invoke heightened
scrutiny, the judicially enforced version of the Equal Protection
Clause requires the plaintiff challenging a facially neutral
measure to establish that an official decisionmaker was moti219
vated by a discriminatory purpose. In suits brought pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment, a disparate impact, no matter
how disproportionate, foreseeable, and unfair, will not suffice to
sustain the suit (though it may provide evidence of the required
discriminatory purpose). The Equal Protection Clause itself
says nothing about motive; states can treat people unfairly
without acting with a discriminatory motive. If the Supreme
are critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic process.”).
212. See Ross, supra note 199, at 315 (“Through sparing use of heightened
scrutiny and extensive application of the deferential rational basis test, the
Court has adopted a policy of underenforcing equal protection issues.”).
213. On purpose tests in constitutional law more generally, see Fallon, supra note 183, at 71–73, 90–94.
214. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
215. Id. at 534–38.
216. See generally Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
217. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
218. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
219. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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Court’s requirement of purpose is to be justified, then, it must
be supported by pragmatic reasons. In Washington v. Davis,
Justice White offered just such a reason. He claimed that a rule
requiring a compelling justification for legislative measures
that have a racially disparate impact would be “far reaching”
and would call into question a whole range of tax, welfare, pub220
lic service, and licensing statutes. Here, as elsewhere in constitutional law, a purpose test provides a minimal protection
against unconstitutional conduct, but its reach falls short of to221
tal enforcement. The Court left Congress to decide whether
and when judges should engage in strict scrutiny of measures
having a racially disparate impact.
Indeed, the Constitution explicitly confers on Congress a
222
power to create decision rules for equal protection cases, illustrating the proposition that constitutional law is not just
what the judges say it is. With its distinct institutional capacities and sources of legitimacy, Congress is—at least some223
times —able to supply remedies where the Court has declined
to act. Moreover, regardless of judicially or congressionally
mandated enforcement, the equal protection norm is valid as a
conduct rule binding other government actors. Legislators and
other government officials remain independently bound to
comply with equal protection, and should not limit their constitutional calculations to asking if judicial doctrine would spell
victory in litigation.
To be clear, I do not seek to defend the particular forms of
underenforcement chosen by the Supreme Court. But, for the
purposes of illuminating the law of contracts by analogy, I
220. Id. at 248.
221. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96
VA. L. REV. 1043, 1081 (2010) (“When important constitutional values are at
stake, and it is difficult for the Supreme Court to agree on an alternative test
of constitutional validity to protect those values, purpose tests provide a minimal protection against abuses of governmental power.”).
222. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
223. In a long line of cases beginning in the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court
has jealously guarded its prerogative to determine the scope of constitutional
rights, and has struck down several congressional attempts to expand access
to judicial remedies under the Equal Protection Clause and other elements of
the Reconstruction Amendments. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2629–31 (2013) (invalidating the Voting Rights Act’s requirement that
changes to state voting laws undergo federal “preclearance” review to ensure
that such changes are not racially discriminatory); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997). But even on the Court’s view of the scope of the enforcement power, Congress has some power to design appropriate decision rules for courts.

2015]

GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

2087

adopt the following aspects of the constitutional law literature:
the analytical distinction between conduct rules and decision
rules; the descriptive claim that the Supreme Court has often
chosen the path of underenforcement in constitutional cases;
and the relatively weak normative claim that perfect judicial
enforcement of demanding, open-ended constitutional norms,
even if attainable, is undesirable.
B. UNDERENFORCEMENT IN CORPORATE LAW
A similar phenomenon is at work in corporate law. Though
it appears that no one has explicitly made the link with the
constitutional law literature, a body of scholarship shows that
the law of directors’ and officers’ duties also consists of partially
underenforced legal norms. About twenty years ago, Melvin Eisenberg pointed to a gap between what courts say directors and
officers must do (“standards of conduct”) and the doctrines that
courts apply when enforcing these duties (“standards of re224
view”). Eisenberg contended that “the standards of review in
corporate law pervasively diverge from the standards of con225
duct.” The idea has even been incorporated into the ABA’s
226
Model Business Corporation Act.
Directors and officers, for example, are subject to a duty of
care in the management of the corporation. When explaining
the duty of care, courts say that a director or officer must take
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be
227
expected to take in the circumstances. This standard, as Ei228
senberg says, is “fairly demanding.” Nevertheless, directors
and officers will often escape legal liability for many breaches
of the duty of care. That is because, when they come to court,
claims for breach of the duty of care are frequently adjudicated
under deferential standards such as the business judgment
229
rule.
To surmount the business judgment rule, it is not
enough to show that the defendant’s decision or action was unreasonable; the plaintiff must show that the defendant is guilty
230
of subjective bad faith, or that the decision was irrational. It
224.
225.
226.
227.

See generally Eisenberg, supra note 30.
Id. at 438.
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–.31 (2011).
See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) cmt. to § 4.01(a), para. 1 (1994).
228. Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 440.
229. Some claims for breach of the duty of care are adjudicated not under
the business judgment rule but under some other limited decision rule, such
as a gross negligence test. See id. at 447–49.
230. See id. at 439–43.
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is much easier for directors and officers to escape liability under rationality review than it would be under reasonableness
review. The business judgment rule “preserves a minimum and
necessary degree of director and officer accountability,” but it is
“considerably less demanding than the relevant standard of
231
conduct, which is based on reasonableness.”
Similarly, according to judicial statements of corporate
law’s duty of loyalty, directors and officers must act fairly in
232
matters involving their self-interest. The standard of conduct
requires both that the terms of the transaction into which the
corporation enters must be fair, and also that those terms were
233
the result of a fair process. Where a disinterested Board of
Directors has not approved the transaction in question, the judicial standard of review hews quite closely to the standard of
conduct. But where a disinterested Board has approved the
transaction, courts apply less searching standards of review,
asking only, for example, whether disinterested directors could
234
reasonably have believed that the transaction was fair. Eisenberg explains that this standard of review accommodates,
on the one hand, “the need to make self-interested transactions
reviewable for fairness,” and, on the other hand, “the value of
institutional autonomy and the desirability of providing selfinterested directors and officers with an incentive to seek early
235
approval from disinterested directors.”
As constitutional law scholars have done, Eisenberg explicitly links his contrast between standards of conduct and standards of review in corporate law to Dan-Cohen’s conduct rule236
decision rule distinction. Like Dan-Cohen, Eisenberg rejects
the reductionist claim that the law consists solely of decision
rules. He affirms the independent significance of standards of
conduct in corporate law as messages to directors and officers
237
about how they ought to discharge their functions. In a recent
231. Id. at 443 (emphasis omitted).
232. Interestingly, Eisenberg concludes that corporate law’s narrow duty of
good faith is not an underenforced norm. Id. at 449. It appears that, even as a
standard of conduct, the duty of good faith in corporate law requires knowingly wrongful conduct. Id. To put the point another way, corporate law’s duty of
good faith is not a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
233. See id. at 450.
234. See id. at 453–54.
235. Id. at 454.
236. See supra text accompanying note 172.
237. For criticism of this claim, and of the divergence thesis in corporate
law more generally, see Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care
and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1152 (2013).

2015]

GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

2089

article building on Eisenberg’s insights, Julian Velasco follows
Eisenberg in noting that, as a result of the divergence between
standards of conduct and standards of review, corporate law’s
standards of conduct are only “imperfectly enforced,” or, using
the very same word as constitutional law scholars,
238
“underenforced.” Standards of review are sensibly more lenient than standards of conduct, so as to leave directors and officers some room for maneuver, and to leave courts some room
239
for error. Velasco is particularly concerned to characterize
corporate law’s standards of conduct as genuine duties, against
claims that, to the extent they go beyond judicial standards of
review, corporate law’s standards of conduct are merely aspirational. For Velasco, as for Eisenberg, it still makes sense to
speak of a legal duty in the absence of a sanction. Corporate
law’s functions include providing guidance for those directors
who wish to obey the law, regardless of whether they will face
liability for violating their duties.
The structure of this claim is similar to the constitutional
decision rules scholars’ understanding of equal protection doctrine. Indeed, scholars of corporate law might fruitfully pursue
the analogy between the underenforcement of directors’ and officers’ duties and underenforced constitutional norms. I will
note just a couple of significant parallels. As in constitutional
law, the existence of some alternative enforcement mechanism
for inducing compliance with the conduct rule helps to build a
case for the wisdom of underenforcement by courts. In corporate law, the relevant alternative mechanisms are provided
mainly by corporate governance structures. Corporate officers
are accountable to the Board of Directors; the Board, in turn, is
mainly accountable to shareholders through means other than
litigation. In the event of conduct that falls short of reasonable
care or fairness in the conduct of self-interested transactions,
shareholders can seek a more active role in corporate decision
making (the mechanism of “voice”) or sell their stock (the
240
mechanism of “exit”).
These governance mechanisms will
generally be more effective than litigation, and at lower cost.
238. Velasco, supra note 31, at 524, 580.
239. See id. at 525, 550–51.
240. The terminology of “exit” and “voice” derives from ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). Hirschman focused more on responses by
customers to decline in firms, but his typology has often been applied to corporate law. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation
Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1323–28
(2001).
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But, of course, corporate governance mechanisms are far from
perfect, and corporate law does not completely forswear judicial
enforcement of directors’ duties. Its standards of review may
perhaps be too deferential, but the courts are not entirely toothless. At the very least, courts maintain a useful role in identifying, and applying legal sanctions to, the worst breaches of the
duties of care and loyalty. In addition, the debate over whether
the unenforced portions of corporate law duties are “merely aspirational” is paralleled by a debate in constitutional law over
whether some of the Constitution’s most demanding norms
241
should be viewed as partly aspirational.
III. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AS AN
UNDERENFORCED LEGAL NORM
In this Part, I pursue the analogy between the
constitutional law of equal protection, corporate law’s duties of
care and loyalty, and the contracts norm of good faith and fair
dealing. By this stage, certain elements of the analogy should
be fairly obvious. All of these norms are stated at a high level of
generality, and all are subject to contestation about their very
meaning and their proper application to the facts of individual
cases. As a result, many commentators and judges have voiced
doubts about the institutional capacity of courts to handle such
broad norms. Crucially, in all three areas, the courts have
declined to enforce these norms to their fullest extent.
Moreover, underenforcement may be justified in each case
because of the availability of alternative institutions for giving
effect to the norm. In the law of equal protection, the most
common alternative mechanism for defining and enforcing a
242
norm is the political process. In corporate law, shareholder
activism and markets provide other ways of inducing compli243
ance with legal duties. In contracts, as I will explain below,
the most obvious alternative mechanisms to give effect to good
faith and fair dealing are self-help measures and reputational
sanctions. But, as in constitutional and corporate law, the
existence of alternative mechanisms has not meant that courts
simply refrain from giving any effect to the norm of good faith
and fair dealing. In all three areas, the courts have attempted
241. Richard Fallon suggests that some constitutional rights should be
viewed as partly aspirational from the point of view of any actor. See Fallon,
supra note 26, at 1324–27. But see Roosevelt, supra note 204, at 197 (expressing discomfort with this aspect of Fallon’s argument).
242. See Part II.A.2.
243. See Part II.B.
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to devise judicially manageable standards, and, moreover, have
often reached for doctrinal solutions focusing on the defendant’s
motivations.
A. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING: THE CONDUCT RULE
I propose that we take the rhetoric of good faith and fair
dealing seriously—as a statement of the conduct rule that
binds the parties to a contract. To that extent, the law of most
states adopts Llewellyn’s vision of a legal norm requiring commercial reasonableness; in the words of the Restatement, good
faith and fair dealing demands compliance with “community
244
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.” As a conduct norm, good faith and fair dealing is analogous to the norm
of equal protection—it is an abstract principle of fairness in
contract performance and enforcement. Just as the equal protection norm prevents government actors from classifying people unfairly, so the basic conduct norm of good faith and fair
dealing prohibits unreasonable exercises of contractual discre245
tion.
Reasonableness in contract performance frequently extends beyond what the contract’s written terms seem to permit
or require. Moreover, reasonableness demands more of contracting parties than avoiding spiteful behavior and borderline
dishonesty. In the words of a business person interviewed by
Stewart Macaulay for his famed study of contractual behavior:
“[y]ou don’t read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you
ever want to do business. One doesn’t run to lawyers if he
246
wants to stay in business because one must behave decently.”
Reasonableness in contractual conduct very often requires the
parties to share losses and benefits unforeseen at the time of
the initial contract. Particularly in contracts of longer duration,
the parties are bound by social norms of reasonableness to ad247
just the terms of exchange to meet with new circumstances.
244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
245. Conceivably, good faith and fair dealing really stands for two norms: a
norm of honesty and a norm of reasonableness. See Thomas A. Diamond &
Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 600–01 (1996). At a higher level of abstraction,
however, the honesty norm might be folded into the reasonableness norm: reasonableness requires honesty.
246. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. See Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An
Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1987).
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Ian Macneil’s work on relational contract theory similarly identifies norms of contractual solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation,
248
and flexibility in the performance of contracts.
While
Macneil’s work is associated with an ex post perspective, broadly similar understandings of what reasonableness in contractual behavior involves have been derived from an ex ante perspective. Robert Scott, for example, defends a general norm of
mutual cooperation in relational contracts, contending that rationally self-interested actors seek to share risks by agreeing,
explicitly or implicitly, to cooperate with their contractual
249
counterparties when new contingencies arise.
The conduct rule of good faith and fair dealing in contract
performance is certainly open-ended. It is, however, a mistake
to leap from the truism that good faith and fair dealing is vague
to the claim that it “has no general meaning or meanings of its
250
own.” As the editors of Corbin on Contracts explain, “[g]ood
faith is a vague and shifting concept, but so is justice. That a
concept cannot be formalized into a tight matrix does not make
251
it wrong.” For more specific guidance as to what counts as
reasonable behavior in a particular class of cases, we might
look to the particular social norms actually prevailing in a giv252
en industry.
These prevailing norms provide significant,
though non-conclusive, evidence of what counts as good faith
253
and fair dealing. The task of discerning the demands of reasonableness in particular circumstances is admittedly a chal248. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 1–35 (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Values in
Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 341, 346–66 (1983).
249. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 604 (1990). As I note in Part III.B, Scott’s
approach differs from mine in that he considers the implied norm of mutual
cooperation to be non-legal.
250. Summers, supra note 49, at 196. But see Patterson, supra note 61
(criticizing Summers’s “excluder” analysis on the ground that it “fails to separate the need for clarification of a fuzzy concept from concepts that are totally
parasitic on other notions”).
251. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 73, § 26.8.
252. For a powerful attack on the idea that one can discern the content of
good faith performance from prevailing practices, see generally Alan D. Miller
& Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 689 (2013). Courts
do not seem to have leaned heavily on specific trade usages when adjudicating
good faith cases.
253. See Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory,
in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL
LAW 12, 16–17, 20–22 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (arguing
that, at least early in his career, Llewellyn saw commercial norms as evidence
of appropriate behavior, not as constituting the standard of proper behavior).
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lenging one for an outsider to undertake.
B. UNDERENFORCEMENT, THE LIMITATIONS OF COURTS, AND
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT
The courts have spared themselves the task of articulating
a fully specified account of good faith and fair dealing. As the
discussion in Part I.B makes clear, the courts do not even try to
enforce the norm of good faith and fair dealing to its conceptual
limits—whatever the norm’s precise meaning may be. Judicial
practice makes clear that good faith and fair dealing “is not an
enforceable legal duty” to behave in accordance with commer254
cial decency toward one’s contractual counterparty. Many
scholars have seen this divergence between rhetoric and reality
as a simple form of hypocrisy. But with analogous examples
from constitutional and corporate law in mind, it should be easier to see now that pro-defendant judicial decisions do not necessarily mean that good faith and fair dealing is not valid as a
conduct rule to its fullest extent.
Just as courts lack the necessary legitimacy and expertise
to discern the precise metes and bounds of equal protection and
of duties in corporate law, so do they labor under analogous
limitations when it comes to discerning fair exercises of contractual discretion. As neoformalist contracts scholars have
stressed, it is both challenging and expensive for courts to
figure out what counts as fair behavior between contracting
255
parties.
The point is not that the courts are completely
unable to give content to vague standards. Indeed, the idea of
good faith and fair dealing is no more uncertain than many of
the legal standards that judges and juries are required to
apply. The tort of negligence, for example, often requires courts
to determine what a reasonable person would have done in the
circumstances, and eliminates or reduces a damage award
when the plaintiff’s own unreasonable conduct contributed to
256
her injury.
The question, rather, is one of relative competence. As in
the constitutional law of equal protection, where most claims of
classificatory unfairness are left by the courts to the political
branches, it is the existence of alternative, often superior ways
254. Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 623 F. Supp. 927, 929 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (emphasis added).
255. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 145 (contending that the costs of having
courts discern commercial reasonableness exceed any benefits it could bring to
parties).
256. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 127, 218 (2d ed. 2011).
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of dealing with unreasonable exercises of contractual discretion
that makes underenforcement of the good faith norm a
plausible strategy. Unreasonable behavior by contracting
parties is usually checked by self-help by the victim, who may
refuse to deal with the other party in future, and by
257
reputational sanctions. Compared with these mechanisms,
litigation is both expensive and in more severe danger of
258
error. Litigation requires lawyers and judges. These outsiders
require payment for their time, and they must also contend
with informational deficits about the parties’ relationship before they can participate usefully in adjudication of the
259
dispute.
On the other hand, when self-help and reputational
sanctions break down—as they sometimes do when the parties’
relationship is at an end—litigation may come into its own in
the limited class of cases where courts are fairly sure they can
identify
a
misuse
of
contractual
discretion.
The
underenforcement thesis thus fits with Eric Posner’s claim—
meant to apply more generally to contract law—that “a court,
with its superior sanctions but inferior information, could do an
adequate job of identifying extreme cases of opportunism but
260
not minor cases of opportunism.”
Along these lines, one court has summed up its limited
ambitions when developing good faith doctrine: “Without
attempting to give positive content to the phrase ‘good faith,’ it
is possible to set forth operational standards by which good
faith can be distinguished from bad faith within a particular
261
context.” Much of the material in Part I.B of this Article can
fruitfully be understood in this way. Thus, a decision rule that
requires plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted from an
improper motive does not exhaust the full scope of the
requirement of good faith and fair dealing. But courts might
sensibly choose a decision rule that limits liability to cases
262
where the plaintiff can establish such an improper motive. Or
257. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships,
104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 392–93 (1990).
258. See id. at 426–27.
259. See id. at 427.
260. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 63 (2000).
261. Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Oregon, 739 P.2d 554, 558 (Or. 1987).
262. See Henry E. Smith, The Equitable Dimension of Contract, 45
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 907 (2012) (“[C]ourts should not aid one who is enforcing a promise out of spite . . . . Where someone is enforcing a right out of
motivation to harm someone else, it is likely that something other than serving contractual purposes or welfare maximization is going on.”).
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courts might choose to review the reasonableness of the
defendant’s decision under a deferential standard of review,
reserving liability for truly arbitrary or unreasoned decisions.
Again, they might impose a heightened burden of proof on
plaintiffs to ease the burden on the courts and to channel the
parties toward self-help and reputational sanctions. In crafting
decision rules for good faith and fair dealing cases, courts have
263
done all of these things and more.
Though my claim that good faith and fair dealing is an
underenforced legal norm is novel, it does not come entirely out
of the blue. Clayton Gillette, whose article was among the
earliest to identify the disparity between the rhetoric of good
faith and its enforcement, hints at something like the
underenforcement thesis when he says that, though
“enforcement of an expansive notion of good faith appears to
264
present overwhelming difficulties,” a more expansive good
265
faith obligation might have a “precatory use.” But, by way of
contrast to my views, Gillette characterizes compliance with a
more expansive vision of good faith as “a supererogatory act”
266
rather than as a matter of duty. Moreover, Gillette adopts the
assumption that legal duty depends for its existence on
267
remedial enforcement by the courts, seemingly leaving no
conceptual space for the enforcement gap between legal conduct
rules and judicial decision rules. Again, somewhat similar ideas
can also be found in the neoformalist scholarship of Robert
Scott, who argues that the parties to relational contracts
operate under two “sets of rules”: a literalistic set of rules for
legal enforcement, and “a more flexible set of rules for social
268
enforcement.” I agree with Scott that two sets of rules are at
play. Scott, however, characterizes the more flexible set of rules
269
as “extralegal norms.” My interpretation of good faith and
fair dealing as an underenforced legal norm allows for the possibility of legally recognized relational norms, even if judges refrain from full enforcement of those norms.
C. WHY ENGAGE IN DELIBERATE UNDERENFORCEMENT?
Admittedly, it would be a fool’s errand to try to establish
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See Part I.B.1–3.
Gillette, supra note 6, at 665.
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id. at 620–23.
Scott, supra note 249, at 615.
Id.
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that good faith and fair dealing is at present an underenforced
legal norm in every jurisdiction in the United States; the case
law is much too varied to admit only of a single interpretation.
I offer one possible way of understanding judicial practice, but
it is not the only conceivable way of doing so. Why should we
choose this understanding of the doctrine as a basis for its future development, as I suggest in Part IV? Why, indeed, should
legislatures or courts ever announce norms that they do not intend to be fully enforced? After all, in this context, and in others, there are some strong reasons against deliberately setting
up a system of underenforcement. For one thing, disparities between conduct rules and decision rules can be misleading, or at
least mentally taxing—it is difficult enough to keep one set of
rules straight, without having to understand two. In corporate
law, for example, some commentators have contended that divergences between conduct rules and enforcement rules are
confusing, and have called for an alignment between standards
270
of conduct and standards of review.
One deflationary way to think about underenforcement is
to see it as a regrettable glitch in the lawmaking process: the
result of a disagreement between different sources of lawmaking authority. In constitutional law, for example, one might say
that underenforcement results from a judicial desire to depart
from what the Constitution itself provides. If the judges could
go back and rewrite the Constitution to make its conduct rules
less demanding (i.e., level them down), they would. But judges
cannot amend the Constitution—they are stuck with it.
Underenforcement, on this view, is just the next best thing to
leveling down. One could tell a similar story about good faith
under the U.C.C. Having been handed what they consider an
overexpansive understanding of the parties’ conduct rules but
being unable to rewrite the Code themselves—this story might
go—judges have effectively amended the good faith provision by
engaging in underenforcement.
The story, however, must be different at least when a given
field is governed purely by common law. In common-law fields,
courts generally could align their conduct rules and decision
rules if they wished. If courts are unconstrained by another
source of binding authority (constitutional or statutory), why
270. See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, Standards of Conduct and Standards
of Review in Corporate Law: The Need for Closer Alignment, 82 NEB. L. REV.
671, 673 (2004) (“[R]egardless of the particular criterion used, a single, clearly
articulated standard is preferable to the current conflation of legal standards
with moral exhortations.”).
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would they want to say they are adopting a norm, yet leave it
partially unenforced? The general doctrine of good faith and
fair dealing thus provides a particularly pure testing ground for
ideas about the justifiability of underenforcement. In turn, if a
case can be made for deliberate underenforcement in the absence of split authority, that case may also apply to cases
where authority is in fact divided.
One possible line of reasoning for deliberately choosing the
path of underenforcement in good faith and fair dealing might
be based on Dan-Cohen’s idea of acoustic separation. According
to Dan-Cohen, a legal system might sometimes be justified in
announcing its (more demanding) conduct rules to the public,
while obscuring its (less demanding) decision rules from public
271
view. By engaging in selective transmission of its norms, the
law can gain maximal compliance with its directives, while
sometimes avoiding the negative consequences of punish272
ment. Selective transmission relies for its effectiveness on
some degree of deception; for some critics, that is enough rea273
son to reject it outright. And whatever its merits in criminal
law, where Dan-Cohen suggested it might be justified, selective
transmission seems a particularly dubious proposition in pri274
vate law. One extra difficulty with engaging in this form of
deception in private law is that private law relations are bilateral. It is one thing to mislead the subject of a criminal law duty into thinking she will face sanctions, only to show mercy in
the event of an actual violation. But it is quite another thing to
mislead the beneficiary of a duty into believing she has an enforceable claim, only to pull the rug out from underneath her
after she suffers a breach. Moreover, in many private law areas, selective transmission is difficult to achieve. In corporate
law, for example, it is surely impossible to hide decision rules
275
from directors and officers. Worse still, because corporate insiders are especially likely to know what really happens when
disputes get to court, the attempt to engage in selective transmission of legal norms may create an added source of share271. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 630.
272. See id. at 667–77.
273. Richard Singer, On Classism and Dissonance in the Criminal Law: A
Reply to Professor Meir Dan-Cohen, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 69, 84–100
(1986).
274. But see Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 634–35 nn.339–42
(1999) (applying Dan-Cohen’s acoustic separation idea to wills law).
275. See Velasco, supra note 31, at 541–44 (rejecting acoustic separation in
corporate law context on normative and descriptive grounds).
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holder ignorance for insiders to exploit. Similarly, selective
transmission is unlikely to be effective in good faith and fair
dealing cases. If anything, uncommunicated divergences between conduct rules and decision rules in good faith and fair
dealing are likely to provide an unfair advantage to repeat
276
players —franchisors, for example—whose discretion the good
faith and fair dealing norm is aimed at constraining.
So when courts design and apply decision rules that diverge from conduct rules, at least in the field of good faith and
fair dealing, they should generally do so openly. But candor in
underenforcement does not necessarily mean that the unenforced portions of conduct rules will be ineffective. To view the
effect of law solely in terms of its enforcement is to miss a great
277
deal. The law affects people’s behavior by providing them
with standards of behavior for use in their practical reason278
ing. People obey legal standards in part because they are the
279
law. In addition, people follow legal standards in part because
they fear they will suffer reputational sanctions when others
280
learn that they have broken the law. Neither of these mechanisms for affecting behavior is vitiated by the absence of a perfectly corresponding decision rule. Moreover, private law’s
guidance function is best achieved through relatively simple,
281
easy-to-understand rules.
Though open-ended, the courts’
general statements about the duty of good faith and fair dealing are much easier to digest than the patchwork of decision
rules they have developed for adjudication.
Having gloried in private law’s guidance function for the
last couple of paragraphs, I should inject an appropriate note of
skepticism about it in the specific case of good faith and fair
dealing. In truth, it is far from clear how much the unenforced
portion of the duty might make a direct difference to the behavior of actual contracting parties. Empirical studies suggest that
even the enforceable parts of contract law play only a minor
276. Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–100 (1974) (describing
the advantages of repeat players in playing the litigation game).
277. See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1656 (2012) (“[T]he law’s authority resides as much in
its ability to articulate recognizable norms of conduct as in the state’s enforcement power.”).
278. For an illuminating discussion of the law’s guidance function, with a
private law focus, see generally Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837 (1997).
279. See id. at 885.
280. See Charny, supra note 257, at 393.
281. See Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 464–65.
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role in commercial dealings, giving special reason to doubt
the idea that, to the extent they are unenforced, judicial and
legislative exhortations to act fairly have a great deal of effect.
As I have suggested, the underenforced portion of the good
faith and fair dealing norm is enforced by nonjudicial sanctions.
But the requirement that one treat one’s contractual counterparty reasonably would be a social norm even without the law’s
intervention. The law’s symbolic support for the social norm
may make a marginal difference—but is that marginal difference enough to justify the potential confusion caused by an enforcement gap?
Perhaps not. But, in the case of good faith and fair dealing
and elsewhere, there is an additional reason to announce a
broad, partly underenforced conduct rule: to influence judicial
behavior. This may appear a paradoxical thought. Conduct
rules, after all, are directed at citizens; decision rules are di283
rected at courts. But, when formulating decision rules, judges
are supposed to take much of their inspiration from the conduct
284
rule they seek to implement. The duty of good faith and fair
285
dealing sets a baseline of reasonable behavior, even if it only
finds partial expression in judicial decision rules. It reminds
judges that contracting is not supposed to be a game of poker,
and that their role—though constrained by pragmatic limitations—is to support healthier norms than those envisaged by a
literal approach to contractual behavior. In turn, a broad conduct rule can be used to put parties on notice that they risk liability if they act in an opportunistic or excessively self286
regarding manner. Courts should thus not be too concerned
about occasionally expanding decision rules to bring them closer to the conduct rule’s demands, even with retroactive effect
on the defendant before the court. Such a policy would help induce defendants at least to think twice before aiming to place
their conduct in the gap between the law’s conduct rules and its
282. Macaulay, supra note 246, at 62.
283. Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 630.
284. See id. at 628–29.
285. See Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions
in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 942–
45 (1989).
286. See Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 15–
30 (Mar. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard University), available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic619738.files/Paper_
08_03-22_Smith.pdf. Smith contends that preventing opportunism is a unifying function for equitable doctrines. Id. at 3. Though the doctrine of good faith
and fair dealing grew up after the fusion of law and equity, it has strong equitable overtones. See id. at 35.
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decision rules.

D. AN OBJECTION: THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERGENCES
At this point, scholars versed in recent debates over contract law’s moral foundations may sense a potential roadblock.
The idea of underenforced legal norms in contract law might be
thought vulnerable to the arguments in Seana Shiffrin’s intricate and thought-provoking critique of the law of contract as it
288
currently stands. While Shiffrin rejects the simple idea that
the law should aim to enforce interpersonal morality as such,
she makes the plausible claim that the law should be compati289
ble with the conditions necessary for moral agency to flourish.
From this perspective, Shiffrin contends that divergences between promissory morality and the law of contract—
particularly the weakness of remedies available for breach of
contract—may contribute to a culture of wrongful promise290
breaking. While Shiffrin does not mention the doctrine of
good faith and fair dealing, we might surmise that its
291
underenforcement would draw her ire. As a matter of promissory morality, the arguments for a robust norm of good faith
and fair dealing seem firm. To the extent that the
underenforcement thesis suggests permissible caution about
the legalization of that norm, the law seems to diverge from
promissory morality.
Contra Shiffrin, however, the best way to support and
maintain good moral character in contractual situations may
often be to allow divergences to open up between promissory
morality and the law of contract, or at least between promisso287. See Kennedy, supra note 81, at 1773–74; Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1214, 1219–29 (2010).
288. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007) (arguing that the law should accommodate the needs of moral agency).
289. See id. at 709.
290. Id. at 740–49.
291. Indeed, one of Shiffrin’s critics, Steven Feldman, cites the existence of
the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing as part of his argument against the
existence of a divergence between contract law and promissory morality. Steven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability in the Law of Contracts: A Response to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 194–96 (2009). Feldman
claims that good faith and fair dealing is a “wide-ranging code of moral conduct that spans the full spectrum of formation, performance, and enforcement.” Id. at 196. Feldman’s descriptive claim is not terribly far off being an
accurate depiction of the rhetoric of good faith and fair dealing, but—as Part
I.B shows—it does not match the reality of enforcement.
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ry morality and judicial decision rules in the law of contract. If
courts were to attempt to occupy the full moral field, they
might do more harm than good. Again, the analogy to constitutional law helps to make the point more vivid. There, the
underenforcement thesis helps to make clear that an action can
violate the Constitution even though no court will provide a
remedy for the violation, allowing space for legislators and citi292
zens to make their own constitutional judgments.
James
Bradley Thayer famously relied on the value of such independent judgments when arguing that courts should apply a “clear
293
error” test when reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.
Thayer contended that, if the courts seek to occupy the field,
the political branches of government will tend to abdicate their
own responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, leading to
294
unfortunate setbacks to constitutional values. Similarly, a
body of judicial enforcement practices that tried to enforce
promissory morality would risk “crowding out” the operation of
295
trust and social norms by means of excessive juridification.
The courts’ inevitably clumsy attempts to enforce the morality
of good faith in full might backfire on moral as well as economic
grounds, hindering people’s ability to develop valuable relation296
ships of interpersonal trust.
But Shiffrin’s underlying premises, particularly when combined with Thayer’s argument, do reinforce my earlier conclusion that courts should be open and clear that their decisions to
impose liability for good faith and fair dealing do not occupy the
full field. Candor in underenforcement should go some of the
way to addressing Shiffrin’s concerns, for it helps to avoid the
implication that a decision to reject the plaintiff’s claim for institutional reasons necessarily entails approval of the defend297
ant’s conduct. Hence, when dismissing claims, courts should
292. See supra Part II.A.
293. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893).
294. See id. at 155–56.
295. On juridification generally, see Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND
SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
296. For intricate discussion of some analogous issues in contract law, see
DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF
CONTRACT 7–87 (2003); Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, 38
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 715–32, 739–45 (2011). For a more economic rendering
of similar ideas, see, for example, Charny, supra note 257, at 428–29, 441–44.
297. I say “some of the way” because even if courts try to make clear that
they are engaging in underenforcement, observers might draw the wrong im-
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be cautious about stating that a particular party’s conduct was
in good faith and complied with reasonable standards of fair
dealing. In closer cases, courts should take pains to say instead
that the plaintiff failed to establish the requirements of decision rules.
To some extent, judicial opinions already do something
similar. Take, as an example, the First Circuit’s decision in a
298
recent case, Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The court was
asked by a mortgage debtor to apply the Massachusetts law of
299
good faith and fair dealing to a creditor’s conduct. The court
rejected the claim because the complaint failed to satisfy the
doctrinal rubric laid down by Massachusetts courts: it did not
300
establish that the bank had acted with an improper purpose.
Nevertheless, the First Circuit’s opinion stated that the bank’s
“dilatory and careless conduct [was] troubling,” found it “problematic” that the bank had refused to give the debtor clear answers about the parties’ relative legal obligations until she
hired a lawyer, and noted that the complaint painted a picture
301
of an “unthinking and sloppy” institution. None of these remarks was strictly necessary for the court’s decision to dismiss
302
the good faith and fair dealing claim. But they do help to
make clear that the enforcement of good faith falls short of
what the conduct rule requires.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The underenforcement thesis both illuminates existing
judicial practice and points the way to a more intelligible and
defensible body of good faith and fair dealing doctrine. While I
do not offer a full elaboration of how the doctrine should look, I
explore four ways that viewing good faith and fair dealing as an
underenforced norm would be helpful to courts and scholars
seeking to develop the law.

pression from the court’s decision to reject a claim of good faith and fair dealing. For a stimulating discussion of some analogous problems in the law, see
generally Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2229
(2013) (“Whenever the law quietly permits some actors to act in a way that is
usually forbidden, copycat misconduct may be erroneously inspired by the
false appearance that ‘others are doing it too.’”).
298. 717 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 2013).
299. Id. at 228, 237–38.
300. Id. at 239.
301. Id. at 238–39.
302. Id. at 239.
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A. LEVELS OF SCRUTINY IN GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Perhaps the most useful analogy between equal protection
and good faith is that the degree of underenforcement of these
norms rightly varies with context. There is no a priori reason
why the choice of decision rule should be made at the wholesale
level. In different contexts, the relative strengths of judicial
enforcement and alternative mechanisms for inducing
compliance with good faith and fair dealing will wax and wane.
A single doctrinal test has the merit of simplicity, but a onesize-fits-all approach is unlikely to be optimal. And existing
doctrine shows some signs of contextual differentiation, though
it is difficult to discern consistent patterns.
As a matter of current practice, many exercises of
contractual discretion get fairly light scrutiny under the
doctrine of good faith and fair dealing, akin to rational basis
303
review in constitutional law. Usually, if a defendant so much
as offers a legitimate reason for her decision, she will escape
304
liability.
And in many cases, a deferential approach to
exercises of contractual discretion may make sense. For example, the courts of Delaware have been especially reluctant to
use good faith and fair dealing to augment the text of preferred
305
stock contracts. Such contracts are typically the result of negotiations by sophisticated and well-advised parties. In this
kind of case, at least, the courts may rightly feel more comfortable with the notion that the parties should be responsible for
identifying constraints on contractual discretion ex ante, rather
than relying on costly and difficult ex post determinations of
306
fair dealing by courts. As in constitutional law, the availability of an—admittedly imperfect—institutional alternative helps
to justify judicial deference.
This line of thought suggests two questions for scholars of
good faith and fair dealing: first, what classes of cases are ripe
303. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
304. On the other hand, if the defendant offers no reason at all for her exercise of discretion, she may well find herself liable. See Empire Gas Corp. v.
Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1340 (7th Cir. 1988).
305. See D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith,
and the Interpretation of Venture Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
825, 851–52 (2004) (“While no one seriously advocates a strict application of
the ‘plain meaning’ approach to contract interpretation in all cases, the Delaware courts have adhered fairly consistently to such a standard in cases involving the interpretation of preferred stock terms.”).
306. But see id. at 850–51 (suggesting that greater judicial intervention
may be justified even in this kind of case because contracts are inevitably incomplete no matter how sophisticated the parties).
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for heightened scrutiny, in the way that race and gender-based
classifications are singled out for special treatment among
equal protection claims? And, second, what sort of heightened
scrutiny should courts give to claims singled out in this way?
Again, existing judicial practice offers some hints; sometimes
courts in good faith cases apply doctrinal tests with real teeth.
For example, in construing some state-law franchise statutes,
courts apply a pro-plaintiff test in which the burden falls on the
307
franchisor to explain and justify a termination decision. The
structural inequalities that characterize many franchise
relationships may well justify a more searching judicial role
because alternative mechanisms for controlling franchisor
discretion are less likely to be effective than in cases involving
two roughly equal commercial parties. Another class of claims
that might deserve—and may even be getting—heightened
scrutiny are claims against subprime consumer mortgage
308
creditors. On the other hand, the near-total absence of scrutiny for employment terminations is difficult to understand in
309
these terms. If anything, such decisions seem particularly
worthy of heightened scrutiny.
These varying forms of treatment rarely receive official
acknowledgement in judicial doctrine. In the interests of clarity
and consistency, courts would likely benefit from borrowing the
idea of differing levels of scrutiny from constitutional law and
applying it explicitly to good faith and fair dealing claims. To be
sure, the claim that the norm is underenforced provides only a
framework for analysis rather than a full set of answers. But
focusing attention on the right questions, and moving towards
a manageable and accessible body of doctrine, would be major
steps forward.
B. TOTAL EXCLUSION OF GOOD FAITH V. LIMITED DECISION
RULE
The idea of good faith and fair dealing as an underenforced
legal norm can also help to illuminate the choice between, on
307. See Am. Mart Corp. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 824 F.2d 733, 734
(9th Cir. 1987). This test certainly falls short of the constitutional law test for
strict scrutiny; I have found no court requiring a defendant in a good faith case
to establish a compelling interest for her exercise of discretion.
308. See Leonhard, supra note 169, at 651–52; see also Joseph William
Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 167 (2012) (discussing the need for laws to ensure parties can bargain “from a position of safety and security,” especially in response
to the subprime mortgage crisis).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 140–43.
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one hand, refusing to enforce good faith entirely and, on the
other hand, giving some limited effect to the norm via a decision rule. Courts often face an analogous question in constitutional law: faced with institutional reasons counseling against
judicial enforcement of a particular norm in a given context,
should they decline to operate in that field entirely (pursuant to
the political question doctrine)? Or should they design a test
that gives some effect to the constitutional norm? Richard Fallon argues convincingly that the burden of persuasion should
fall on those who advocate complete judicial abstention as opposed to the development of some sort of manageable stand310
ard.
Certainly, total exclusion of the implied norm of good faith
and fair dealing might well be justified in the right
circumstances. The law of interstate compacts provides a
potential illustration, at an interesting intersection between
public law and private law. Agreements between and among
311
the States must be approved by Congress,
and disputes
arising from them come before the Supreme Court under its
312
original jurisdiction. The Court treats interstate compacts as
contracts, and generally interprets them in line with general
313
principles of contract interpretation. Nevertheless, in 2010,
the Supreme Court ruled that states are not subject to implied
duties of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of an
314
interstate compact. The court ruled that North Carolina’s
explicitly stated power to withdraw from a compact could not
be subjected to review for its fairness in the way that a private
315
party’s exercise of discretion might.
In explaining this
decision for the Court, Justice Scalia stressed institutional
factors: federalism and separation-of-powers concerns
counseled against a rule that would permit the Supreme Court
to supplement the express terms to which political branches of
316
state and federal governments have agreed. Moreover, the
310. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1306–09 (“Viewed along a spectrum, a
determination of nonjusticiability due to the absence of judicially manageable
standards is simply the limiting case of a decision to underenforce constitutional norms.”).
311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
312. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
313. See, e.g., Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2130
(2013) (“Interstate compacts are construed as contracts under the principles of
contract law.”).
314. Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351–52 (2010).
315. Id. at 352.
316. Id.
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context in which interstate compacts are drafted and ratified
suggests that these compacts are more likely than ordinary
317
contracts to be considered complete at the time of drafting.
But in other areas, such as at-will employment, some
courts seem to have moved too soon to the conclusion that good
318
faith and fair dealing has no role to play. More generally,
when one considers the wide range of potential decision rules
from which courts can choose in implementing the good faith
and fair dealing norm, the neoformalist critique of the general
duty of good faith seems to be an overreaction. While Bernstein, Scott, and others may have been right to criticize Llewellyn’s attempts to incorporate commercial morality in its entirety into commercial law, the neoformalist critique has
considerably less bite on a doctrine of good faith that is
underenforced via the operation of constrained, judicially man319
ageable standards.
C. SHOULD THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BE
EXCLUDABLE?
Distinguishing between good faith and fair dealing as a
conduct rule and good faith as a set of judicial decision rules also sheds some light on a doctrinal conundrum: should parties
be able to contract out of the norm of good faith and fair dealing? Existing law suggests that the obligation of good faith is
320
not just a default rule, but an immutable rule. The general
duty of good faith under the U.C.C. cannot be disclaimed by

317. As Justice Scalia noted, the drafters of several interstate compacts for
the disposal of radioactive waste have explicitly chosen to incorporate duties of
good faith into those agreements. Id. at 353 (citing Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, §§ 222, 224,
225, 99 Stat. 1859, 1865, 1886, 1897 (1986) (referring to the Central Interstate
Low–Level Radioactive Waste Compact, Central Midwest Interstate Low–
Level Radioactive Waste Compact, and the Midwest Interstate Low–Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact)).
318. See supra Part I.B.4; supra note 17.
319. Stewart Macaulay makes a similar point when responding to Bernstein’s work. Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of
Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 775, 787–88 (2000). If, as Bernstein suggests, there are often reasons to doubt the existence of trade usages, why isn’t it sufficient to meet this
concern to craft a decision rule whereby the party seeking to rely on a trade
usage bears the burden of establishing it?
320. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (noting that
“under the Uniform Commercial Code . . . the duty to act in good faith is an
immutable part of any contract”).
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agreement. Admittedly, the Code quickly qualifies the immutability of good faith, noting that parties can define the standards for judging good faith, so long as their chosen standards
322
are not “manifestly unreasonable.” Similarly, though there is
little case law on whether parties can contract around the general common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing, some
323
courts have said that attempts to do so will be ineffective. In
the words of the New York Court of Appeals, “[n]o covenant of
immunity can be drawn that will protect a person who acts in
324
bad faith, because . . . the courts will not enforce it.”
Supporting the immutability of good faith, some writers
325
have claimed that it must be either self-contradictory or
326
fraudulent to enter into a contract while denying one’s obligation to perform in good faith. But these arguments become substantially less powerful when one allows for the possibility of a
divergence between conduct rules and decision rules. It need
not be self-contradictory or fraudulent for a party to wish to exclude judicial enforcement of good faith and fair dealing. Commercial parties, in particular, might rationally and fairly decide
that the risk of error and litigation costs that would accompany
legal enforceability are not worth the benefits that judicial enforcement would bring. Thus, there seems to be little reason for
a complete ban on excluding a good-faith-based judicial decision
rule by means of an explicit contractual provision. In this respect, the U.C.C.’s rule that the duty of good faith is partially
immutable is somewhat difficult to justify. On the other hand,
for familiar reasons, the courts should often be suspicious of attempts to exclude the duty of good faith and fair dealing by
clickwrap and other standard-form consumer contracts, and
should limit the duty’s displacement to genuine cases of agreed
exclusion.
D. ARBITRATION DECISIONS ON GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
In constitutional law, the underenforcement literature
suggests that political actors lacking the institutional limitations of courts should take a more expansive view of constitu-

321. U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (2013).
322. Id.
323. STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH:
FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT 72–74 (1995).
324. Indus. & Gen. Trust v. Tod, 73 N.E. 7, 9 (1905).
325. Markovits, supra note 35, at 284.
326. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 323, at 74.
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tional rights and duties. Applying this insight to contract law,
comparative institutional considerations suggest that arbitrators are in a position to impose more demanding duties of good
faith and fair dealing. More than courts, which tend to be
staffed by generalist judges and juries who lack expertise, arbitrators are often in a better position to identify unreasonable
328
contractual behavior, and at a lower cost. Other things being
equal, the case for gaps between conduct rules and decision
rules is lessened, and such gaps should be smaller.
329
Though the available evidence is equivocal, the application of the good faith norm in collective bargaining does seem to
provide one example of arbitrators giving fuller effect to the
good faith norm than their judicial counterparts. As we have
seen, the majority of American states refuse to apply the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment
330
termination cases. But labor arbitrators adjudicating collective bargaining disputes have been willing to give serious force
331
to the covenant. The covenant is well established as a matter
of arbitral jurisprudence, and has, for example, been applied to
disputes over employers’ decisions to sub-contract work in ar332
guable violation of the spirit of a labor agreement. In the absence of a contrary contractual provision, management must
demonstrate that its decision to sub-contract—and thus to
avoid the collective bargaining agreement’s employment provisions—was “made in good faith and [is] objectively reasona333
ble.” In labor arbitration, the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing “serves as the basis for the proposition that manage334
ment discretion must be exercised reasonably.” The degree of
underenforcement is further reduced by decisions that place
327. See supra Parts II.A.1–2.
328. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5–6 (1995) (reasoning that arbitrators may be
in a better position than courts to detect substandard contractual performance).
329. As against the example in the text, Lisa Bernstein contends that some
industry-specific private arbitration bodies apply a “formalistic” approach,
seemingly hostile to enforcement of a good faith norm. See supra note 146.
330. See supra Part I.B.4.
331. Brudney, supra note 139, at 806–07.
332. Id. at 807.
333. See In re Libbey Glass, Inc., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 182, 186–87
(2000) (Ruben, Arb.) (finding no violation of the covenant as a result of an employer’s decision to sub-contract because of cost considerations).
334. Sierra Chem. Co., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1593, 1595–96 (2005)
(Pool, Arb.) (finding a violation of the covenant resulting from employer’s failure to consider relevant evidence during an employee grievance proceeding).
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the burden of satisfying this doctrinal test on the manage335
ment.
Perhaps this greater arbitral willingness to enforce the
covenant of good faith against employers is just a result of the
dynamics of labor negotiations, but my analysis suggests other
reasons why it might make sense. Labor arbitrators have a
greater degree of expertise in the subject of labor disputes, and
are presumably less prone to the kinds of errors made by generalist courts, which are more likely to fail to understand the
parties’ employment relationship. Moreover, these considerations have obvious implications for judicial review of arbitration decisions. Of course, courts already have general reasons
to defer to the decisions of arbitrators—but those reasons are
particularly strong in the good faith and fair dealing field.
CONCLUSION
My purpose in this Article has been to establish that good
faith and fair dealing can helpfully be understood as an
underenforced legal norm. But the status of underenforced legal norms is—to use a word from the constitutional law litera336
ture—a larger metadoctrinal issue.
The phenomenon of
underenforcement appears to exist elsewhere in private law.
Most fundamentally, the idea of an enforcement gap between
legal duties and available sanctions helps to make sense of how
the courts talk about remedies in contracts, torts, and property
cases. In particular, the notion of underenforced legal norms
provides a line of response to Holmes’s aphorism that there is
no duty at common law to keep one’s contracts—only a duty to
337
pay damages. Once we have abandoned the assumption that
being vulnerable to judicial sanction is the essence of legal duty, we can see why courts speak of legal duties to keep contracts even where specific performance is not available, and of
rights to exclude others from property even where a court will
not award an injunction.
It is no coincidence that constitutional law scholarship
338
helps the analysis. For various reasons, similar metadoctrinal
335. See Libbey Glass, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 186–87. But see In re
United Technologies Auto., 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 769, 772–73
(1997) (Richard, Arb.) (applying a good faith balancing test).
336. See Berman, supra note 180, at 4.
337. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
338. In the last few years, the trend has mostly been in the opposite direction; scholars have more often drawn ideas from private law into debates
about public law. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 859–60, 931 (1999) (contending
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questions have received more attention from scholars in constitutional law in recent years than have analogous questions in
private law. For some time, much interesting and original work
in private law eschewed the internal perspective on doctrine,
preferring to assess contracts, torts, property, and so on
through the lenses of other disciplines, especially economics.
Without jettisoning the enormous insights to be gained from interdisciplinary scholarship, I suggest that private law would
339
benefit—and is benefiting —from a metadoctrinal turn of its
own. By juxtaposing problems of doctrinal design from constitutional law and private law, we can shed light on questions of
comparative institutional analysis that cut across legal do340
mains.

that private law insights as to the relationship between rights and remedies
cast useful light on analogous questions in constitutional law); David E. Pozen,
Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 11–12, 49 (2014) (importing self-help ideas from private law into the constitutional law literature);
Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 63 (1994) (drawing on the law of contracts to illuminate constitutional law); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians As Fiduciaries, 126
HARV. L. REV. 671, 677 (2013) (contending that politicians should be treated as
fiduciaries, subject to a duty of loyalty).
339. See Goldberg, supra note 277, at 1655–60.
340. See Neil Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics:
Reflections on Forty Years in the Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265, 323
(2013); see also Smith, supra note 305, at 849–51 (noting the relevance of comparative institutional analysis to questions of good faith in contracts).

